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Abstract: There are few studies done on the use of remittances to finance terrorism. Remittances 
have previously been seen in connection with development policies but have in recent years been 
linked to funding of terrorist groups. The main objective of this study is to identify the 
relationship between remittances, economic inequality and terrorist events. Using remittance data 
from the World Bank the thesis aims to study how remittances, as well as underlying economic 
inequality might impact the occurrence of terrorist events. Using count data on domestic terrorist 
events and transnational terrorist events (by perpetrators country of origin) and applying negative 
binomial regression we study how remittances and economic inequality influence the occurrence 
of terrorist events. The findings support some of the hypotheses. There exists a relationship 
between increased transnational terrorism and remittance inflows, even when controlling for 
economic inequality. Contrary to previous studies no significant relationship can be found 
between domestic terrorism and remittance inflows. Vertical inequality, in the form of economic 
inequality, is significant across all domestic and transnational models. There are clear indications 
that the relationship between remittances and transnational terrorism warrants further study.  
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 1 
1 Introduction 
Are migrant remittances used to finance terrorism? In the months following the September 11, 
2001 attacks, new counterterrorism measures were hastily enacted to hinder the financing of 
future terrorist attacks. President Bush issued an executive order on terrorist financing shortly 
after the attacks. The aim was to “starve terrorist of their support funds” and to “target the 
support structure of terrorist organizations, freeze the US assets and block the US transactions 
of terrorists and those that support them” (White House 2001).  By freezing the funds of 
potential terrorists and blocking potential funding towards terrorist groups, the US 
government hoped to pre-emptively hinder the financing of terrorist acts and cull terrorist 
groups. Terrorist organizations are dependent on funding to effectuate their operations, which 
is why intercepting these financial flows are so central to counterterrorism activities 
(Schneider, Brück & Meierrieks 2011).  
 
The aim of this thesis is to study the economic conditions for terrorism and examine the effect 
of potential funding flows to discern whether there is in fact a causal relationship between 
specific economic factors and terrorism, as much of the recent years counterterrorism 
measures rest on an assumption of such a causal relationship existing.  
 
The remittance industry has been especially affected by these new counterterrorism measures. 
Migrant workers living abroad often remit some of their wages to their countries of origin, 
using the international banking system to transmit these remittances. Remittance 
transmissions are legal, but become illegal if the end use is funding of terrorist groups or 
individuals. Attempting to discern the end use can prove difficult. The process of remittance 
transactions has in recent years been under scrutiny, as banking firms transmitting the 
remittance funds have been accused of being “conduit[s] of terrorist financing” and allowing 
remittances to be used as funding for terrorism (Aufhauser 2003).  
 
One of the earliest causalities of this new critical approach to remittance transactions was the 
Somali bank chain al Barakaat. The firm was accused of enabling financing to terrorist 
organization, which led to the freezing of all their global assets by the US Treasury 
Department in 2003. As the largest transmitter of remittances in Somalia, the closing had a 
great impact on local communities in Somalia that depend on financial transmissions from the 
diaspora abroad.  
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In countries such as Somalia, remittances are the main source of income for many households. 
Estimates have found that approximately $1.3bn is transferred into Somalia annually; 
outperforming international aid into the region and representing over half of the countries’ 
gross national income (Watkins 2013). The increased regulatory system of global finances 
could prove to have great ramifications for developing nations. Stricter controls and 
difficulties in transferring remittances can prove detrimental in poorer communities, as 
remittances from the diaspora represent a large percentage of the GDP. Whether remittances 
are in fact used to fund terrorism will therefore have big implications for future policy 
decisions. Remittances are one of the great economic flows today and any attempts at 
restraining or hinder these transmissions should not be taken lightly. 
 
Identifying the correlates of terrorism is a central part of terrorism studies and the field has 
seen a growing interest in the role of economic factors in influencing terrorist mobilization. 
How do economic factors influence the occurrence of terrorism? And what economic pre-
conditions influence the occurrence of terrorism? The aim of this thesis is to test for a 
potential causal relationship between remittances and terrorist mobilization.  
 
There is little systematic analysis done to assess the effect of remittances on terrorism. Only 
two larger quantitative studies exist to date on the use of remittances to finance terrorist 
groups. The Elu and Price study focused only on the sub-Saharan region and found that much 
of the remittances sent were used to fund terrorist acts. Mascarenhas and Sandler (2013) 
criticized these findings as unrealistic. Their 2013 study found a connection between 
terrorism and remittances, but nowhere near the numbers presented by Elu and Price. Our 
paper seeks to expand on this, by looking also at the pre-existing levels of economic 
inequality. Is it the remittances in themselves that causes terrorism or is economic inequality 
also an important underlying factor? 
 
Poor economic conditions have often been ascribed a central role in explaining the existence 
of terrorist groups. Previous studies on poor economic conditions indicate that poverty is 
unlikely to have a mobilizing effect on terrorists (Piazza 2006: Krueger & Malecková 2003). 
Absolute poverty might not influence terrorist mobilization, but this thesis will argue that 
economic inequality, as a form of relative deprivation, is on the other hand an important 
determinant of terrorism. Economic inequality will be included in our analysis to see whether 
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the underlying economic inequality or remittances help explain the occurrence of terrorism 
and terrorist mobilization.  
 
Relative deprivation theory describes how a gap between the expected and the obtained levels 
of welfare leads to feelings of discontent. By using relative deprivation as a theory of political 
violence, the discrepancy between expected and obtained level of economic welfare should be 
a determinant of terrorist mobilization. The thesis will also base it theoretical foundation on 
the rational actor school, where the actions of terrorist are viewed as explainable through cost-
benefit decisions.   
 
A time series cross-section analysis of terrorist events in 185 countries over a twenty-five-
year period, from 1980 to 2005 will be analyzed. The statistical models will study both types 
of terrorism: transnational terrorism and domestic terrorism. The first statistical models will 
use transnational terrorist events as the dependent variable, before applying domestic terrorist 
events. Domestic terrorism represents the most common form of terrorism, but is 
underrepresented when it comes to large quantitative studies, which focus nearly exclusively 
on transnational terrorism (Cuenca & Calle 2009).  
 
The remittance data from the World Bank is country level and accounts for remittances as a 
percentage of the country’s GDP. Ideally, micro and household level data on remittances 
should also have been included but as there exists little to no quantitative data on the end use 
of remittances in the receiving countries. This obfuscates the exact causal path between 
remittances and terrorist mobilization. While the results are circumstantial (i.e. that countries 
that have high remittance inflows are also prone to more terrorist mobilization), the findings 
are interesting and an important contribution to discerning whether remittances are connected 
to countries with higher terrorist mobilization. After applying different controls to the models 
this causal link is still significant and present, therefore establishing a plausible relationship 
between remittances and terrorism.    
 
The relationship between economic inequality, remittances and terrorism is largely unstudied. 
This may in part be explained by the lack of solid data on economic inequality and up till 
recently, the lack of good data on remittances. This thesis aims to fill that lacuna by studying 
how remittances and economic inequality impact terrorist mobilization.  
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The paper is the first global study on the relationship between remittances, economic 
inequality and the occurrence of terrorism. Earlier terrorism research has been criticized for 
limited methodological approaches and especially for the lack of applied inferential statistics 
(Silke 2007). The depth and breadth within the discipline has steadily improved and the 
terrorist attacks on 9/11 led to an upsurge of interest in the field. The use of statistical analysis 
and inferential statistics is particularly on the rise; nearly 26 percent of all articles published 
on the subject in the major journals now use a quantitative approach (Silke 2007).  
 
The main findings of this thesis indicate that remittance flows are significantly associated 
with increased terrorist mobilization within a country, at least in the case of transnational 
terrorism. Surprisingly there was no significant relationship between domestic terrorist events 
and remittance inflows, contradicting the previous findings to Mascarenhas and Sandler 
(2013). While both remittances and economic inequality has strong explanatory powers in the 
transnational models, only economic inequality was significant of the main independent 
variables in the domestic models.  
 
1.1 Thesis outline 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether remittances and economic inequality have any 
effect on the mobilization of terrorists. The thesis is divided into four principal sections, 
following the introductory chapter. Chapter 2 lays the theoretical groundwork for the thesis. 
Remittances and economic inequality have previously been studied separately and this 
research is shortly presented, as well as political violence and terrorism as a discipline. The 
chapter begins with placing terrorism studies within the larger field of political violence in 2.1 
Subsection 2.2 and 2.3 presents the two main theoretical approaches: the deprivation school 
and the rational actor approach. The academic discussions on how these two schools place 
themselves in the debate between “greed” and “grievances” as explanations for terrorist 
mobilization will also be shortly discussed in 2.4. Subsection 2.5 attempts to conceptualize 
terrorism and study the main approaches to terrorism research and its leading paradigms. 
Subsection 2.6 examines remittances as a global phenomenon and the paradigm shift in 
studying remittances since 9/11.  Challenges related to capturing the size of remittance flows 
are also touched upon. Remittances can flow through both formal and informal channels, and 
how these channels influence the surveying of remittances. The section also reviews research 
that claims that remittances are used to fund terrorism. Subsection 2.7 deals with the issue of 
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economic inequality and the argument of relative deprivation. Measuring income inequality 
can prove difficult and the subsection will therefore look to possible ways of measuring based 
on previous studies. Subsection 2.8 will look briefly at previous studies before the chapter 
concludes in 2.9, where the chapters’ main arguments are presented and the five main 
hypotheses presented.   
 
Chapter 3 examines the methodological background of the thesis, more specifically the 
models, variables and the underlying logic of stochastic model theory. The subsection 3.1 
gives a short overview of the statistical method, as well as a closer look at the underlying 
logic of stochastic model theory. Negative binomial regression, which is commonly used on 
overdispersed count data, will get a short introduction in subsection 3.2. In 3.3 the time series 
cross sectional analysis will be presented, as well as some of the underlying assumptions. 
Subsection 3.4 features the variable choices, starting with the dependent variable, then the 
main independent variables and ending with the control variables. The construction of the 
data will also be briefly touched upon. 
 
The results from the statistical models are presented in chapter 4. The chapter will first 
present the results from the transnational terrorist model and the necessary robustness checks 
in 4.1, before moving on to the domestic terrorist models in 4.2. The main findings will be 
thoroughly discussed and the estimations from both models contrasted and compared. 
Additional robustness checks and alternative models will also be shortly presented in 4.3. 
These have been included to control the findings in the original benchmark models  
 
Concluding remarks round out the thesis in chapter 5, with a brief look at the implications of 
the results as well as the main contributions of the thesis to the field of terrorism research.  
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2 Theory 
The theoretical foundation of terrorism studies has developed from theories on collective 
action and political violence (Schmid & Jongman 2005[1988]).  Much of the theory presented 
in this chapter hails from this tradition. Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the literature 
and previous studies on remittances, economic inequality and how they relate to terrorist 
mobilization. The first section of chapter two will present the two main theoretical approaches 
and how they relate to the thesis. The next section will attempt to conceptualize terrorism and 
the differences in transnational and domestic terrorism. The third section explores the concept 
of remittances and the shift within remittance studies. Before the events of 9/11 the discipline 
focused mainly on remittances as a force for development and “self-aid”. The “War on 
Terror” has created a paradigm shift within policy and academic life, where remittances are 
now discussed as a possible source for funding terrorism. As chapter 2 aims to provide a solid 
theoretical foundation for a series of statistical models it will also be necessary to discuss the 
quality of the available remittance data. 
 
The effect of economic inequality and how feelings of inequity can impact the occurrence of 
terrorist events will also be examined. Economic inequality is a normative term and the 
section will therefore also present a clear theoretical basis for the concept when applied to our 
analysis.  Previous studies will also be shortly presented before rounding out the chapter with 
a summary of the main arguments and formulating five hypotheses that the statistical models 
aim to answer.   
 
2.1 Terrorism as political violence 
Political violence is not limited to violence committed by political actors or for a political 
cause, but encompasses a much broader spectrum of violence. According to Bloxham and 
Gerwarth (2011) political violence expresses itself in four distinct ways: 1) Violence in the 
form of military actions such as civil war; 2) genocidal violence or ethnic cleansing; 3) 
violence from terrorism or state repression; and 4) revolutionary or counter-revolutionary 
violence. There are many similarities and shared dynamics between all four forms, though 
each manifestation also has unique traits (Bloxham & Gerwarth 2011).  
 
Some of the literature used in this thesis is on civil war. Civil war and terrorism represent 
different manifestations of political violence, but share some commonalities when it comes to 
 8 
the underlying logic, as using violence against civilians to shape their political behavior is 
common for both civil war actors and terrorists (Kalyvas 2004).  
 
2.2 The Deprivation/Relative Deprivation approach 
Economic inequality refers to a specific form of inequality related to wealth and income 
distribution.  Chester (1976) argues that poverty is not directly related to crime rates, but 
rather a perceived relative deprivation amongst those committing the crimes. An individual 
might not experience absolute poverty, but if the person perceives their own economic 
position as less than another, the sense of relative deprivation might still impact their general 
welfare. Studies indicate that there is no strong empirical evidence to support the “rooted-in-
poverty” thesis and a direct connection between poverty and terrorism (Piazza 2006: Krueger 
& Malecková 2003). Rather it is the feeling of impoverishment relative to someone else that 
leads to criminal behavior (Chester 1976).  
  
The term relative deprivation was initially used in a study of American soldiers during World 
War Two. If soldier A is deprived of X, comparing himself to soldier B who has X, soldier A 
is “relatively deprived” compared to the point of reference (Stouffer 1949). Runciman further 
developed the concept in his study of social inequality in Britain.  
 
We can roughly say that a person is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) 
he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or 
expected time, as having X (whether or not this is or will be in fact the case), (iii) he wants X, 
and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X (1966:10) 
 
Applying the paragraph above to the case of economic inequality, an individual might expect 
certain levels of economic equality, only to find that the actual level is not bestowed upon 
them. Relative deprivation is simply a term used to illustrate the tension created by 
discrepancies in peoples’ goals and their actual achievements, compared to other groups or 
individuals (Gurr 1970). Gurr argues that there is an increased propensity for political 
violence in societies where this feeling of deprivation is systematic and ingrained in the fabric 
of society. So-called “deprivation-induced discontent” stemming from economic inequality is 
therefore central in explaining political violence (1970:13). Implicit in this argument is a 
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positioning of socio-economic justice as the motives behind violent opposition movements 
(Lichbach 1990).  
 
The deprived actor school (DA) attempts to describe how this sense of deprivation is linked to 
violent actions. Much of relative deprivation theory is based on psychological theories that 
attempt to explain how this discontent turns to dissent through different cognitive processes 
(Jakobsen 2007). It is through these processes that the deprivation turns into grievances and 
these grievances result in violent behavior (Gurr 1970) (See Fig.1). Gurr refers to this as the 
frustration-aggression mechanism, which is an important factor in explaining human nature’s 
predilection for collective violence (1970).  
 
The view that economic inequality is a source of conflict can also be found within the 
deprived actor school (Jakobsen 2007). Societies plagued with unequal distribution of wealth 
are believed to be at greater risk of conflict than more egalitarian societies. The ordinary DA 
approach to relative deprivation is based on an actor judging their gains relative to one’s own 
expectations. In the case of inequality, the causal mechanism work differently, as inequality is 
judged relative to other actors within the same society (Regan and Norton 2005). The 
relationship between economic inequality and political violence also referred to as the 
Economic Inequality-Political Conflict (EI-PC) nexus (Lichbach 1989: Piazza 2006).  
 
Figure 1. Relative deprivation model 
Source: Jakobsen (2007) [Gurr 1970]. 
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2.3 Rational actor approach 
The classical depiction of terrorists as madmen and irrational actors does not have basis in 
any empirical evidence. Most studies on terrorist behavior have found their actions to be 
internally consistent with their goals and objectives, which indicates a large degree of 
rationally on part of the terrorists (Stohl 1979; Caplan 2006). The idea of terrorists as rational 
actors has their basis in economic theory. The economic model of crime views criminals as 
rational actors who are able to maximize their utility while at the same time weighing the 
cost-benefit of their actions (Becker 1968). Extending this economic model of crime to 
terrorism has been increasingly common within the field of terrorism studies (Krueger and 
Malecková 2003). Most economic analyses of terrorism have employed rational-choice 
models as their theoretical foundation (Enders & Sandler 2002; Caplan 2006). Rational actor 
theories have developed as a response to the deprivation school and are critical of 
deprivation/grievances as sufficient explanatory factors for the occurrence of political 
violence (Jenkins 1983; Zimmerman 1983).  
 
Rational actor theories view resource mobilization and opportunity structures as paramount 
mechanisms for understanding the occurrence of political violence (McCarthy & Zald 1977; 
Eisinger 1973). If, as stated above, we view all actors as rational and follow rational actor 
logic the mobilization of resources or opportunities would weigh into a terrorists cost-benefit 
calculus. Lichbach has used a game-theoretic approach to illustrate how a rational actor would 
not rebel against inequality, without also obtaining some form of reward for their participation 
(1990). As rational actors, or “homo economicus”, terrorists are able to rank different possible 
tactics on the basis of risk, time and the probability of being stopped by the authorities 
(Sandler, Tschirhart & Cauley 1983; Gurr 1979). By weighing the risks against the benefits 
terrorist are able to make rational choices. This is also corroborated by extensive empirical 
studies that have found behavior amongst terrorist that indicate a rational response to risk 
factors (Mickolus 1976; Sandler et al 1983; U.S Central Intelligence Agency 1981). Terrorists 
have proven flexible in their tactics and a willingness to adapt to changes in measures aimed 
at eliminating terrorist behavior. An example of this is the installation of metal detectors at 
airports and stricter controls at governmental buildings. These measures have not been able to 
lower the risk of terrorist events, but simply induced the terrorist to choose other forms of 
terrorism where the costs have not risen (Mickolus 1980; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
1981). While their acts can be deemed immoral and wrong, they are internally consistent with 
the group’s motives and goals. 
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The rational actor approach is popular amongst political scientist studying terrorism and 
terrorist activity
1
.  While the goals of terrorists vary, it is not the goal that indicates 
rationality, but rather how the terrorists pursue these goals when faced with, inter alia, the 
above-mentioned limitations.  This makes terrorist events a form of political behavior done by 
a rational actor, as terrorists are able to efficiently exploit their limited resources to reach their 
goals (Crenshaw 1981; Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). The act of terrorism is therefore simply 
a logical means to an end. 
 
2.4 Greed versus grievance 
Recent studies on political violence have focused on two main explanatory factors in 
explaining the occurrence of political violence (Murshed 2007). As mentioned previously, the 
literature on political violence is not always related directly to terrorism and while not all civil 
wars are plagued with terrorist attacks, there are some of the same underlying logic found in 
civil war violence and violence generated by terrorists (Kalyvas 2004).  The greed argument 
is based on rationalist theory and focuses on the opportunities for political rebellion (access to 
funds and natural resources) (Østby 2008). Collier and Hoeffler, in their 2004 article “Greed 
and Grievances in Civil War”, contended that factors explaining the occurrence of civil war 
were “greed-driven” rather than “grievance-driven”. Their study found that economic 
variables have a stronger explanatory power than social variables. The view of political 
violence as being grievance driven focuses on the motives for rebelling (inequality, ethnic 
cleavages etc) and is based to a large extent on theories from the relative deprivation school 
(Østby 2008; Collier & Hoeffler 2004). Jakobsen argues that the greed vs. grievances debate 
is a continuation of the rational actor vs. deprived actor arguments.  
 
As Østby points out, the “greed-grievances” debate should not be seen as an “either-or” 
discussion but rather as an interaction between the two (2008:145). The focus should instead 
be on synthesizing the two explanations, combining competition for resources (greed) with 
historical grievances to understand ongoing political violence (Murshed 2010; Murshed 
2002). The two might be complimentary, with both greed and grievances providing 
motivating factors for political violence.  
 
                                                        
1 Anderton & Carter 2005; Shughart n.d; Sandler, Tschirhart & Cauley 1983; Caplan 2006 
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It is also necessary to understand how these two theoretical approaches are relevant for our 
research.  The two main independent variables of this thesis, migrant remittances and 
economic inequality, each represent a side of the DA-grievance and RA-greed argument. 
Economic inequality is a grievance and derived from the DA school theory that strong enough 
grievances will lead to political violence. High levels of income inequality will lead to 
feelings of deprivation and is, following the logic of Gurr’s model of deprivation, is an 
important cause of violence (see Fig.1). Migrant remittances, on the other hand, function as a 
form of economic stimulus and create an opportunity for rebellion, following the logic of the 
RA and greed argument.  
 
2.5 Conceptualizing terrorism 
The phenomenon of terrorism is a complex one, involving a diverse set of groups and 
individuals with radically different reasoning behind their actions.  Terrorism as a concept is 
highly politicized, with strong negative connotations, making it a powerful weapon, as those 
labeled as such face great political costs and lack of legitimacy. As Lutz and Lutz point out, 
taking the same violent action and redefining it as terrorism alters the perception of said 
action (2004). Instead of defining someone as a terrorist, but rather as a freedom fighter, a 
rebel or revolutionary, it is implied that the violence committed is done so for the greater 
good and is therefore a moral action. The term can therefore be used to ascribe violence acts 
specific values and because of this value-laden nature the term is often wielded as a political 
weapon. Consequently, it is highly necessary to conceptualize the term.  
 
The terminology for terrorism should seek to be as neutral as possible and separate moral 
evaluation on the use of violence and rather aim for an objective understanding of the action 
(Combs 2000).  The field of terrorism studies has generated many different understandings of 
the term terrorism. For the purpose of this paper we will apply one of the most widely used 
definitions, formulated by Enders and Sandler.  Enders and Sandler have attempted a broad 
definition that encompasses the complexity of terrorism: 
 
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational 
groups against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the 
intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims (2006:3) 
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This is a broad definition that encompasses the complexity of terrorism, but in addition it is 
important to establish three facts before determining whether a violent action constitutes as 
terrorism: who is the victim, the perpetrator and the audience? Whether an act of violence can 
be defined as a terrorist act is dependent on whether the victim is classified as a civilian or 
military force. An example of this is the Israeli government, which defines an attack against 
military targets as terrorism, while most countries do not define attacks against the military as 
such as long as it is part of an occupying force (Enders & Sandler 2006). The data for the 
dependent variable used in this paper follows the same tradition and does not count attacks 
against occupying forces as an act of terrorism.  
 
The audience of a terrorist attack is the group that the event is mean to terrorize. Terrorist 
bombings on for example public transportation is meant to create anxiety amongst the general 
public; as the randomness of the attacks leads to uncertainty and a state of unrest. The victims 
of the attack are therefore not a goal in themselves but rather the means to reach a larger 
audience. Reaching a larger audience is central to terrorists, as they attempt to bypass regular 
political channels and enact change through violence or the threat of violence (Horgan 2005).   
 
Defining the perpetrators can prove challenging. Attacks by the state or government against 
its populace can be similar to an act of terrorism, but Enders and Sandler separate terrorism 
and state terror. Following their definition, only individuals or subnational groups can be the 
perpetrators of terrorism.  The focus of this thesis will be on the perpetrators as it aims to 
study the economic determinants of terrorist mobilization and events.  
 
2.5.1 Transnational and domestic terrorism 
As the statistical models in this thesis aim to study the effects of remittances and economic 
inequality on both transnational and domestic terrorism, it will be necessary to differentiate 
between the two.  Transnational terrorism can be one of two things; 1) attacks by foreign 
terrorists against domestic targets within a country or 2) domestic terrorists attacking a 
foreign target within a country. The attacks of on September 11, 2001, was committed by 
foreign nationals on U.S soil and is therefore an example of the first kind of transnational 
terrorism.  The transnational dependent variable used in the statistical models are coded by 
Mascarenhas and Sandler (2013) but based on data material from the International Terrorism: 
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Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) database. Therefore beneficial to apply their 
definition as well:  
 
 […] the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes 
by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental 
authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target 
group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its 
perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of 
its resolution, its ramifications transcend national boundaries (Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock & 
Flemming 2012: xii). 
 
The ramifications of transnational terrorism bypasses traditional borders, either because of the 
nationality of the perpetrators and victims differ, or because the location of the event differs 
from that of the perpetrators nationality.   
 
Domestic terrorism on the other hand, has much less convoluted interactions between the 
different actors. Terrorism is classified as domestic if it is “homegrown”, that is, if both the 
target, the venue of the attack and the perpetrators all hail from the same country. A domestic 
terrorist is someone who engages in terrorist activities within their own country of origin. 
Domestic terrorism will therefore only have direct consequences for the venue country 
(Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev 2011). The American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
adds to this definition that the perpetrators not only operate in their homeland, but also that 
they lack foreign direction (Jarboe 2002). Consequently, domestic terrorist attacks do not 
include attacks that are part of larger international groups, such as Al-Qaeda. Studying both 
types could yield interesting results, as the determinants of transnational terrorism might 
differ from those of domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorism occurs at much higher rates than 
transnational terrorism (see Fig.2) but is still, as mentioned introductory, understudied 
compared to transnational terrorism (Cuenca & Calle 2009). 
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Figure 2. Global terrorist events 
 
Author's calculations. Source: WDI data 2013 
 
2.5.2 Correlates of terrorism 
The main goal of counter-terrorism measures is to understand the necessary factors and 
conditions for terrorists to mobilize (O’Neill 2002). In order to implement efficient counter-
terrorism policies figuring out these correlates are essential, condicio sine qua non. 
Nonetheless, identifying the factors that influence the occurrence of terrorist attacks has 
proven difficult. The underlying determinants of terrorist mobilization vary from country to 
country and within different groups (O’Neill 2002). This variation across countries makes it 
difficult to identify common denominators on a global scale.  
 
Bjørgo has defined four levels of causation when discussing the preconditions or precipitants 
of terrorism (2005). These four levels are: 1) structural causes, which affect individuals but 
can be abstract to understand, as they exist on a macro level; 2) facilitator causes, are those 
factors of modern society that enables terrorist activity; 3) motivational causes are the 
grievances that actors experience which motivates them to act and finally; 4) triggering 
causes, which are the events or actions that trigger terrorism (see Fig.3). 
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The thesis will focus mainly on the structural and motivational causes. Demographic 
imbalances, class structures and relative deprivation are all typical structural causes of 
terrorism and will be studied closely in the thesis. The motivational causes are often structural 
causes that have been translated, through ideologues and leaders, into persuading arguments 
for people to act. Motivational causes can also be seen as the symptoms of more structural 
issues. Bjørgo has also described motivational causes as manifestations of structural issues 
(2005).  
 
 
Figure 3. Four levels of causation 
 
Source: Adapted after Bjørgo's levels of causation (2005). 
 
2.6 Conceptualizing remittances 
Labor migration is one of the main economic strategies chosen by the relatively poor and 
plays a central role in many developing nations (Eversole 2005). These labor migrants are a 
central feature of modern globalization and their migration sees those of little economic 
means travel from densely populated areas (with labor surplus) to less populated, and often 
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richer, areas (with labor shortage). This transfer of human resources inevitably leads to a 
transfer of economic resources, from the migrants abroad to their homesteads (Brown 2006).   
These economic resources are the sum of money migrant workers transfer back home and are, 
as Brown (2006) points out, simply a “resource transfer” from a rich area to a poorer area, 
done through the migrants and their families instead of through larger organizations. Within 
economic literature these economic flows are known as remittances.  
 
These remittance flows (see Fig.4) have increased exponentially in the last few decades, as 
globalization and migration has sped up and made cross-border movement easier. 
Remittances are today a central source of financing, especially in poorer parts of the world 
and are in many countries outperforming more traditional economic capital flows. New 
estimates from the World Bank indicate that global remittance flows reached $542 billion in 
2013 (2013).  
 
Figure 4. Global flow of remittances and FDI, 1980-2005. 
 
 
This makes remittances one of the largest and most stable global financial flows, only 
outsized by foreign direct investments (FDIs). Remittances are especially important for 
economies in developing countries where they represent a large percentage of the GDP. In 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
C
o
n
st
a
n
t 
U
S
  
D
o
ll
a
rs
 (
B
il
li
o
n
s)
 
Author's calculations. Source: WDI data 2013 
Remittances
FDI
 18 
countries such as Somalia remittances largely outpace traditional aid and equity flows (Ratha 
2005; Keese 2005). These transfers have in recent years been increasingly seen in connection 
with funding of terrorist groups.   
 
2.6.1 Remittances studies: from developmental aid to potential terrorist funding. 
Remittances are in essence a large inflow of capital into a market. Earlier studies show that 
increased remittances lead to a rise in the household income of the migrant families and 
increased purchasing power (Acosta, Lartey & Mandelman 2009). How the remittances are 
utilized varies greatly, but previous studies have found that the remitted funds are used mainly 
for current consumption or asset accumulation, in effect to cover basic living expenses and 
ensuring investments and savings (Taylor 2004; Brown 2006).  The fact that migrant workers 
remit to their countries of origin is described by Ratha as a form of home bias in investment 
(2005). Migrants are more likely to continue to invest in their country of origin as they seek to 
improve the quality of life for their families and their local communities. Remittances have 
also proved themselves to be a resilient financial flow during the financial crisis, when they 
remained stable while other flows, such as FDIs, declined (Afram 2012)   
 
Much of the earlier literature on remittances has focused solely on its role as a contributor to 
development and its benefits for the local communities
2
.  The terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2011 and the subsequent “War on Terror” has seen a paradigm shift, with increased focus 
on remittances role in global financial crime and funding of terrorist activities, rather than 
aiding development. This can be seen in recent years counter-terrorism policies that focus 
increasingly on the idea that remittances are used to fund terrorist attacks (Elu & Price 2011; 
Vaccani 2011;Williman 2001; Mascarenhas & Sandler 2013). 
 
2.6.2 Funding terrorism 
Large-scale terrorist operations such as the 9/11 attacks, as well as smaller attacks all require 
financing. Most terrorist cells are independently financed and funds are transferred to the cells 
in small amounts, to avoid suspicion (Schneider 2004).  Schneider estimates that terrorist 
groups such as Al-Qaeda have an annual budget somewhere between $20 and $50 million 
(2009). These funds are mainly derived from criminal activity such as drug trafficking and 
                                                        
2 Russell 1992; Adams 1991; Rubenstein 1992; Taylor 1999 
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financial support from supporters. International efforts to squash the financing of these 
terrorist organizations have been done in an attempt to reduce terrorist activity.  
 
The fight against terrorism follows the logic of the War on Drugs. Much in the same way that 
the American government has focused on cutting on the financial support to the drug cartels, 
the FATF and the US government have mainly focused their efforts on attacking the banking 
systems that enable transfers of funds to terrorist groupings. Counter-terrorism measures in 
the War on Terror have attempted to freeze and block the financial assets of alleged terrorists, 
in hopes of hindering terrorist attacks. Disrupting the financial flows of terrorist organizations 
is not a new idea and was used diligently by the British government against Northern Irish 
resistant groups during the 1970s and 80s (Anderson 2013).  
 
The financing of terrorism can be done in different ways. Illegal funds can be transferred 
electronically, across borders with minimal control. In the case of remittances the funds are 
viewed as legal in the banking system, but become illegal if their end use is terrorism. 
Attempting to differentiate between them and discerning their end use can prove difficult.   
 
Monitoring of financial systems has been part of U.S. law since the implementation of the 
Bank Secrecy Act in 1970. Following the 9/11 attacks, the act was further strengthened by the 
implementation of the Patriot Act. Shortly after the attacks, an executive Order on Terrorist 
Financing was issued by President Bush, intending to “starve terrorist of their support funds” 
and to “target the support structure of terrorist organizations, freeze the US assets and block 
the US transactions of terrorists and those that support” (White House 2001).  
 
The Financial Times reported in 2001 that the Al-Qaeda attacks on September 11
th
, 2001 were 
financed with funds passed through a network of banks, including France’s Credit Lyonnais, 
as well as other big European Banks (Willman 2001). The money-transfer company Western 
Union was also implicated, as it was used to transfer terrorist funds from the United States to 
the United Arab Emirates (Business Week 2001).  
 
The United States and the United Kingdom have had some limited success in freezing the 
assets of groups such as the Taliban, but with the resources required, the strategy can prove 
too time consuming and costly (Rider 2004).  In addition the strict regulation imposed might 
exclude legitimate businesses and low income, undocumented groups and individuals in both 
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developed and developing countries (Loughlin 2012). Counter terrorism measures that aim to 
hinder transactions makes it increasingly difficult for migrants to share their wages with their 
families “back home” (Vleck 2006) 
 
As remittances are only illegal if used to fund terrorism the end use is highly important. The 
new regulatory climate following the War on Terror has put the nexus on the banking sector 
to discover possible terrorist funding within their own systems.  
 
Investigations into the Somali bank al Barakaat found no evidence of a connection between 
the money transfer chain and Al-Qaida, but that did not deter the Treasury Department from 
continuing the hardline approach to financial transactions (Roth, Greenburg & Wille: n.d).  
In 2013 it was announced that Barclays, one of the last European bank providers of remittance 
transfers, was closing the accounts belonging to 146 of its 165 remittance transfer partners 
(Popham 2013). Amongst these was Dahabshiil, the largest money transfer operator in the 
Somali region (since the closing of Al-Barakaat) (Ring 2013). Barclays decision to close the 
Dahabshiil account came on the heel of a $1.9bn fine given to the banking giant HSBC. 
Inadequate regulatory systems and lack of controls of monetary transfers was cited as the 
reason behind the enormous fine given to HSBC by the US authorities (Worstall 2013). The 
closing of these remittance channels and attempts at closing others have been faced with 
criticism from interest groups such as Oxfam, as well as Somali organization the Heritage 
Institute who claims that attempts at closing remittance channels will “have a deleterious 
impact on hundreds of thousands of people across Somalia” (The Economist 2013; The 
Guardian 2013) 
 
These cases are not unique, as many American and Canadian banks are unwilling or unable to 
handle remittance traffic to countries such as Somalia. Many developing countries lack the 
necessary infrastructure to comply with standards of transparency required by the new 
regulations, but are at the same time the countries most vulnerable to these new hindrances in 
remittance flows (Omer n.d) 
 
Within the European Union the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established to 
monitor and make recommendations on combating potential threats to the international 
financial system. Terrorist financing has in recent years been one of their main concerns.   
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The FATF have applied different measures to avoid misuse of remittance channels, such as 
lobbying for stronger regulatory systems and other initiatives intended to hinder terrorist 
groups from receiving funds through remittance transfers from migrants abroad (FATF 2002).  
 
2.6.3 Measuring remittances 
The transmission of remittances goes through specific channels. These remittance channels 
function as an economic bilateral flow, comprised of four points (IMF 2009). The first is the 
sender, who transmits the money; then the intermediaries and their payment interfaces in both 
the sending and receiving country; before reaching the recipient. Together these four points 
comprise the channels. The focus of our analyses is on the last point; the recipient and the 
recipient’s country (IMF 2009).   
 
These channels are often classified in the remittance literature as either formal or informal 
channels. Though the name might indicate it, there is not a clear-cut difference between the 
two. Formal channels are authorized to handle money transfers and are often banks or other 
registered institutions for money transfers. The informal channels are legal, but operate 
outside of the more formal regulations. Often in these cases the intermediaries are not formal 
businesses. Whether a remittance channel is formal or informal can differ from country to 
country and while a channel might be formal in one country, it might not be in another (IMF 
2009). The funds being transferred are often small and formal banking services are slow, with 
high transaction costs, making informal and less regulated channels more attractive for the 
remitters. The use of informal remittance channels makes data collection difficult and has in 
the past made it hard to gather reliable data on remittances (IMF 2009).  
 
According to the IMF the informal and non-regulated channels are becoming increasingly 
obsolete with reforms and liberalization of the global financial infrastructure (2009). This has 
made remittance transmissions easier and less costly, creating incentive for migrants to use 
formal channels when remitting. The formalization of remittance channels has greatly 
benefitted the data available on remittances. With more official data on the amounts of 
remittance being transmitted globally it has become easier to gather aggregates and to conduct 
statistical analysis on the impact of remittances (Ratha 2003;Vlcek 2006).  
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2.7 Inequality 
From a historical perspective, the fight against inequality has been a driving force in all, 
major episodes of political violence. From the French Revolution’s chant of “liberty, equality, 
fraternity” to the Russians revolutionaries promise of “peace, land, bread”, inequality has 
been implicitly linked to violent upheavals and challenges to the status quo (Lichbach 1989).  
Discussions about equality and inequality has also been central within the scholarly traditions 
ranging from Aristotle to Marx, as they have understood inequality as the primus motor 
behind political violence and conflict
3
.  
 
Inequality is a broad term and can be separated into three specific types; economic, social, 
and political inequality (Runciman 1966). Everyone from policymakers and campaigners to 
academics uses the concept of inequality in a multitude of settings. The close bond between 
inequality and violent revolt is the focus of many studies, but this paper will focus specifically 
on the one between economic inequality and political violence.  
 
2.7.1 Measuring inequality 
To answer questions related to economic inequality it would first be necessary to find an 
appropriate measurement of said inequality. There are conceptual issues related to how 
inequality is measured that are necessary to clarify. It has in recent years become increasingly 
common to differentiate between two concepts when discussing inequality: vertical inequality 
and horizontal inequality. Horizontal inequality measures inequality between groups, defined 
by identity factors such as ethnicity and religion. According to Østby (2008) inequalities that 
coincide with group identities (e.g. ethnic cleavages) has the potential to increase grievances 
amongst the relatively deprived, to a larger degree than vertical inequalities. Inequality 
between groups creates polarization, which in turn enhances the sense of grievance and group 
cohesion amongst those that feel relatively deprived, which in turn leads to conflict 
mobilization (Østby 2008; Murshed & Gates 2005). Studying the relationship between 
political violence and inequality can produce varying results, depending on whether the focus 
is individuals or groups and whether these inequalities are of an economic, political or social 
dimension (Østby 2008; Stewart 2002).  
 
                                                        
3 Aristotles. 1997. Politics. Translation by C.D.C Reeve. Hacket Publishing Company.  
Marx, Karl and Fredrick Engels. [1884]2012. The Communist Manifesto. London: New Left  
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For the purpose of this thesis the statistical models have included the Gini variable (based on 
the Gini index) as a measure of inequality. The Gini index effectively measures the economic 
inequality between individuals. Income distribution is a commonly used amongst economist 
and functions as a vertical measurement of inequality. By recording the incomes of everyone 
in society, from “top” to “bottom”, and thus the Gini index measures the inequality that exists 
between individuals within a given country (Stewart 2000). 
 
2.7.2 Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient 
Measurements of inequality within economic theory falls into two categories; either through 
attempts at aggregating and describing inequality objectively or through a normative 
understanding of social welfare and ethical notions related to it (Sen [1973]1997).  Taking the 
objective approach requires a statistical measurement of inequality. There exists many 
different ways of measuring inequality, but one of the most widely used measurements is the 
Gini coefficient. The coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion and measures the 
inequality of a distribution, in this case the distribution of income (Gini 1921).   
 
According to Sen, this is best illustrated in viewing the coefficient in terms of the Lorenz 
curve (1997[1973]). The curve is used to illustrate the unequal distribution of income/wealth 
within a population (see Fig.5).  
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Figure 5. Lorenz curve illustration 
 
Source: Author's illustration 
 
The horizontal axis represents the population (in percentages) from poorest to richest, while 
the income of the bottom x% of the population is represented in the y-axis.  
If perfect income equality existed, the Lorenz curve would coincide perfectly with the 45-
degree equality line. The bottom 5% would have 5% of the income; the 15% would have 15% 
of the income and so on. This is unrealistic, as the bottom income group will have a 
proportionally lower share of income (Sen 1997[1973]). Due to the lack of equality, the 
Lorenz line will be a curve and lie below the equality line. The Lorenz curve will also 
increasingly get closer to full equality as we get closer to the richest sections of a population. 
The Gini coefficient represents the ratio of the discrepancy between the two lines (Sen 
1997[1973]). The Gini variable included in the statistical models of this thesis is based on the 
Lorenze curve.  
 
2.8 Previous studies 
The possible connection between economic remittances and terrorist events is highly 
contentious and little research exists on the subject. There are indications of a relationship 
between remittances inflows and financing of Islamic terrorism (Lyman & Morrison 2004) 
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and the financing of terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Andres 2008; Deans, Lonnqvist and 
Sen 2006;Loxley & Sackey, 2008) 
 
In the first global study on the relationship between remittances and terrorism there was found 
a clear and positive effect between remittances as a share of gross domestic product and 
terrorist attacks (Mascarenhas & Sandler 2013). The study is unique and proves some insight 
into the possibility of a relationship between remittances and terrorist events. Employing four 
dependent variables that cover different types of terrorism, using a variety of data from the 
Global Terrorist Database (GTD) and the ITERATE database. Their study found a 
significant connection between terrorist events, both domestic and transnational, and 
remittance inflows. Of their 16 models, remittances have a positive impact on 14 of them, 
with the strongest impact found between remittances and transnational terrorist events based 
on perpetrators’ nationality (Mascarenhas & Sandler 2013). These findings indicate that 
remittances are especially a concern for transnational terrorism when it is sent to the 
terrorists’ country of origin.  
 
Identifying economic inequality as a correlate of political violence is common in studies done 
on the subject
4
. Most major statistical studies on civil war or forms of political violence 
include economic inequality as a possible variable. According to Lichbach, studies on 
political violence that do not include economic inequality as a factor should at least mention it 
as a specification error (1989).  
 
Studies have found that those who identify with a lower economic class report greater feelings 
of powerlessness and a clear linkage between feeling powerless and increased likelihood of 
joining in illegal activities and crime (Braithwaite 1979; Messner & Golden 1992). 
Previous studies have also found that there higher levels of crime in communities with high 
levels of inquality (Chiu & Madden 1998; Bourguignon 2001). 
 
The effect of socio-economic preconditions in influencing terrorist events is difficult to 
pinpoint. Economic development (or in the case of income inequality, economic 
underdevelopment) interacts with other social phenomenon, making it hard to identify what 
exactly is influencing the occurrence of terrorist events (Schneider, Brück & Meierrieks 
2011). 
                                                        
4 Gurr 1970; Koseli 2006; Kayaoglu 2007; Piazza 2006; Nasir, Ali & Rehman 2011 
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 Recent years has seen an increased focus on understanding how interactions between social 
and economic factors impact political violence. Østby argues for the importance of studying 
the different dimensions of inequality. A large quantitative study conducted across 36 
developing countries across a 18-year period, found significant connection between civil war 
and horizontal inequalities. Vertical inequality, in the form of economic inequality, was not 
significant when horizontal social inequality was included (Østby 2008). Findings from Østby 
(2008) and Stewart (2002) find that horizontal inequalities are a strong explanatory factor 
when it comes to civil war and political violence. 
Results from studies by Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) and Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) 
indicate little consensus on the role of economic grievances in the exacerbating terrorist 
events. 
 
Muller and Seligson’s cross-sectional time-series study of eighty-five states found that 
economic inequality is a significant predictor of political violence, when controlling for other 
factors (1990). The same findings were evident in London and Robinson’s analysis of fifty-
one developing countries. Socioeconomic factors, such as income inequality were important 
factors in explaining the presence of political violence (1989). A panel study of 65 countries 
between 1975 and 1999 also found that higher levels of inequality are significantly linked 
with higher terrorist activity (Krieger & Meierrieks 2010) 
 
Case studies of revolution and regional analyses of political violence have also found a 
significant relationship between inequality and the likelihood of some form of political 
violence
5
. As mentioned previously, there exists a certain degree of consensus on the 
importance of economic inequality in explaining political violence. Therefore natural to 
assume that economic inequality will have a significant impact on the occurrence of terrorist 
events.  
 
2.9 Summary of arguments and hypotheses 
This study rests on an assumption that terrorists are “rational” actors, following an internally 
coherent logic in an attempt at reaching a specific goal. It is assumed that terrorists operate 
                                                        
5
 Midlarsky, Manus I., 1988. Kileff, Robinson and Leland W. Robinson, 1986. Nejad, 1986. 
Hamby, 1986. 
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with an internally consistent set of convictions, values and worldview. While these values and 
convictions might be deemed immoral and wrong, they are internally consistent with the 
group’s goals and make it possible to analyze potential explanatory factors for their actions. 
The inclusion of the economic inequality variable is done on the background of the 
deprivation theory, which claims that grievances rather than opportunity/greed drive terrorist 
mobilization. Remittances on the other hand represent an opportunity for terrorist 
mobilization. Through this the two main independent variables represent these two schools of 
thought.  
  
Earlier studies have focused on remittances as a force for development and its end use in the 
migrants’ local communities. Within the study of migration and remittances there has been a 
paradigm shift following 9/11 attacks. Regulation and close scrutiny has become 
commonplace within the global financial sector, in hopes of stopping assets belonging to 
terrorists and their networks. The “War on Terror” and counter terrorism measures aimed at 
cutting the terrorist funding has cast a suspicious glow on the global flow of remittances.  
 
There have been few studies done on whether remittances are in fact a force for terror and 
terrorist funding. There is only one comprehensive global study on the connection between 
terrorist events and remittances, done by Mascarenhas and Sandler (2013). Their findings 
point towards a significant link between remittances and terrorist events, especially 
remittances sent to the home country of the perpetrators. The study done by Mascarenhas and 
Sandler did not include and control for economic inequality. This is a potential specification 
error, as remittances might simply be a proxy for inequality. Still, the current discourse on 
remittances indicate a connection to terrorist prone countries, which leads to the following 
hypotheses:   
 
H1: Remittances into a country have a significant impact on the number of 
transnational terrorists. 
H2: Remittances into a country have a significant impact on the number of domestic 
terrorist attacks. 
H3: The explanatory power of remittances will be strongest in the transnational 
models. 
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Economic inequality, as a divisive force in society, has the potential to create grievances 
among disenfranchised individuals. The unequal distribution of income/wealth creates a sense 
of relative deprivation amongst the affected groups, which should theoretically lead to the 
disenfranchised groups opting for violence to challenge the inequality and the status quo 
(Krieger & Meierrieks 2010; Collier 2000). Earlier studies done on the relationship between 
terrorist events and economic inequality indicate a strong significant relationship between the 
two and stress the importance of including it.  
 
H4: High economic inequality within a country increases the number of transnational 
terrorist events stemming from that country.  
H5: High economic inequality increases the number of domestic terrorist attacks. 
 
As mentioned above, by not including economic inequality in their study Mascarenhas and 
Sandler run the risk of specification error. Based on earlier studies it would be natural to 
assume that economic inequality is important in explaining terrorist events.  
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3 Research design and method 
Chapter 3 begins with a brief look at the quantitative method and stochastic model theory. As 
our data material aims to study whole populations, it would also be prudent to look closer at 
the logic behind continued use of significance tests when we are no longer generalizing from 
samples. The subsequent sections will look at time series analyses and assumptions related to 
longitudinal and cross-sectional data, before moving on to the use of negative binomial 
regression to model count data. The variables included in the statistical models will also be 
presented, as well as the possibility of an endogeneity bias between the two main independent 
variables: remittances and economic inequality.  
 
3.1. Stochastic model theory 
There exist two main statistical theories on generalizing from data samples: statistical sample 
theory and stochastic model theory (Aaberge & Laake 1984). Statistical sample theory aims to 
generalize from the collected data sample to the population at large (from where the sample 
was drawn). 
 
As the statistical models developed for this thesis aim to study the entire population (or as 
close to as possible, rather than a sample, we are operating within stochastic model theory. If 
we follow the logic of statistical sampling theory the use of significance levels and confidence 
intervals would be superfluous as we are studying the entire population and should garner 
perfect predictions (Jakobsen 2007). But as we are operating within stochastic model theory 
this is not the case. We are generalizing from the observations to the mechanisms that 
generated observed data. The collected data used in the statistical models is generated from a 
stochastic experiment, where the findings will differ, even if the conditions are held constant 
(Jakobsen 2007; Blekesaune 1996).  
 
Using confidence intervals and significance testing is therefore still important when studying 
the entire population. If no significance is found, the association between the dependent 
variable and the independent variable is no more probable than an association produced by 
chance (Jakobsen 2007).  
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3.2 Negative binomial regression 
Typical regression models such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is based on 
certain assumptions that prove difficult to satisfy when using data related to criminology 
(Maxfield & Babbie 2001). In OLS regressions the dependent variable is assumed to be 
continuous and its distribution normal (McClendon 1994). Data related to criminal events are 
often neither. Criminal incidents are usually unevenly distributed as rare event counts. That is 
to say, small values (often zero) are the most commonly observed value across the spatial 
units (Piza 2012). Most countries are unlikely to experience a terrorist event, which is 
reflected in the high number of zero-counts. This uneven distribution breaks the assumptions 
of OLS, necessitating the use of either Poisson or negative binomial regression. Both 
estimation methods are able to analyze count data that includes a large number of zero-counts 
(rare events data).  
 
Poisson regression assumes that the conditional mean of our dependent variable is equal to its 
conditional variance (Long 1997; Hilbe 2007). When the data is over-dispersed this 
assumption is violated, as the conditional variance of our dependent variable is likely to 
exceed the mean. This violation can cause underestimated standard errors and can possibly 
create spurious significance.  
 
The rare events dependent variables in our statistical models suffer from overdispersion 
amongst the observations. To be able to correctly model our data, it will be necessary to apply 
Negative binomial regression instead. Negative binomial regression adds a dispersion 
parameter that models the unobserved hetereogeneity that exists amongst our observations (Li 
& Schaub 2004; Osgood 2000; Paternoster & Brame 1997). The overdispersed data is no 
longer an issue and the variance is able to exceed the mean without creating possible 
modeling errors.  
 
The excessive zero counts might also be generated by a separate process and it could 
therefore be beneficial to model the excess zeros independently, using zero-inflated binomial 
regression (ZINB). To check for this we run a Vuong test, but we find no evidence to support 
the ZINB model. Both Piazza (2011) and Mascarenhas and Sandler (2013) have run 
regressions with terrorist events as dependent variables. Both found that the results from 
ZINB and standard negative binomial regression obtain similar results for both transnational 
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and domestic terrorism. This thesis will, based on this and the results from the Vuong test use 
negative binomial regression rather than ZINB. 
 
3.3 Time Series Cross-Section Analysis 
The main characteristic of a time-series is a set of observations xt, with each observation 
recorded at a specific time t. Cross-sectional analysis is repeated observations on fixed units. 
The units are in most cases states or nations. The data used in this thesis is gathered at specific 
time intervals (year) and on a fixed unit (country), making it a time-series cross-sectional 
analysis. The observations are gathered sequentially from repeated measurements over a 
twenty-five-year period (1980-2005).  
 
The dispersion of time series observations varies across time, as they are affected by trends 
and cyclic tendencies (Yanovitzky & VanLear 2008; Ruspini 2002). These variations make it 
possible to describe changes across time and spatial units. This in turn makes it possible to 
look at long-term trends of a phenomenon (Chatfield 1989). Phenomena such as terrorist 
events are by their very nature “time-bound” processes. As a process terrorist events cannot 
be studied independently from the past or future, as it is constantly evolving (Yanovitzky & 
VanLear 2008). Studying terrorist events through a time series cross-section analysis makes it 
possible to model time and space and in turn generalize from the results.  
 
Time series cross-sectional models can be developed as either lagged or a non-lagged. When 
running a non-lagged model the dependent and independent variables are observed at the 
same time. As this makes it impossible to see possible effects on the dependent variable over 
a period of time, we will include a lag in some of the independent variables and run a lagged 
time series model, (Ostrom 1978; Yanovitzky & VanLear 2008). By lagging some of the 
independent variables with one year, the effect of our independent variables on the dependent 
are given time to manifest and will be beneficial for testing our hypotheses, especially in the 
case of remittances and the economic control variables. 
 
 
 
 32 
3.3.1 Assumptions 
Correlation 
Our independent variables will correlate with themselves over subsequent time intervals and 
across space, in the form of spatial and autocorrelation (Yanovitzky & VanLear 2008). 
Successive observations will be dependent on each other and a variable will therefore 
correlate with itself over time.  
 
Cross-sectional time series models are often plagued with heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the error terms. To handle these issues, robust standard errors are estimated and 
clustered over countries. According to Williams (2000) this should ensure that the standard 
errors are robust to both heteroskedasticity, as well as serial correlations. 
 
Stationarity  
A time series is “stationary” if the mean and variance does not change over time or position 
(Hamilton 2006). Time series modeling assumes that the series is stationary and theory is 
derived based on the assumption that the mean and variance of the time series is constant. 
Non-stationary data can be unpredictable and therefore difficult to model and infer from.  
Results from non-stationary data run the risk of being spurious and indicating a significant 
relationship between variables where there is in fact none (Nason 2006). To mitigate the 
potential spurious effect year dummies have been included in alternative models that will be 
presented after the main findings in chapter 4. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
should also efficiently even out any temporal dependence that exists within the data. 
 
3.4 Variables 
In a regression analysis there are two types of variables: the endogenous (Y) variable and the 
exogenous (X) variables, also known as the dependent and the independent variable. We will 
first look at the endogenous variable used in our models, before moving on to look at the 
exogenous variables that are included to explain changes in endogenous. There are two main 
exogenous variables, while the rest are utilized as controls based on previous research and 
literature related to terrorism and political violence. The analysis covers 185 countries over a 
twenty-five year period, 1980-2005.  
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3.4.1 Dependent Variables 
The two dependent variables included in our models are, as mentioned previously, terrorist 
event counts. The transnational dependent variable is constructed by Mascarenhas and 
Sandler (2013) and based on data compiled from the ITERATE database (Mickolus et al 
2012). The aim of the ITERATE database is to quantify transnational terrorist groups and 
their attacks in a large-n database. The database consists of numerical data gathered from 
international press and news agencies, used to create chronological observations and accounts 
of all transnational terrorist events around the globe. The variable is coded to study the 
perpetrators country of origin, rather than the venue of the attack. This enables us to test the 
effect of remittance inflows into the perpetrators country of origin. Intuitively, the remittances 
sent to the perpetrators country of origin is of greater interest than remittances sent to the 
“host” country of the attack. To ensure this is studied correctly the dependent variable should 
therefore identify the perpetrators nationality, rather than focus on the country where the 
attack takes place.   
 
The domestic dependent variable is constructed by Piazza (2011) and based on event data 
from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  Terrorism datasets differ from other social 
science datasets, as they are constantly evolving as new attacks take place. The validity of the 
data is therefore of critical importance, which is why the quality of the news sources is 
paramount. GTD uses different media sources, such as news articles, electronic news archives 
and other publicly available sources. Like the ITERATE database, GTD gathers information 
on each terrorist incident, with numerous variables for each attack (GTD 2013). The first 
seven models use the transnational counts (see Table 3.) as the dependent variable, before the 
domestic count variable is included as the dependent variable in the last seven models (see 
Table 4.).  
 
3.4.2 Remittances  
To measure the effects of remittances we have included a variable with data from the World 
Bank.  As earlier mentioned, the ability to compile data on remittances varies greatly across 
countries. In most countries reporting on remittance transfers is required, with banks and 
financial institutions reporting to financial authorities or central banks. The rules on reporting 
are not homogenous, which has a significant impact on the compilation of remittance 
statistics. Remittance as a financial activity is often reported as part of larger statistical 
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information on general financial activities, including cross-border transactions, foreign 
exchange controls etc. As financial transactions (including remittances) are routed through a 
banking system there will exist some form of paper trail for most transactions.  
 
Remittance transfers are included in the balance of payments statistics, but no single entity in 
the balance of payment framework captures the exact transactions in remittances (IMF 2009). 
This complicates the aggregation of remittance data, and requires the use of different data 
points to discern remittance flows. To compile remittance data, two main sources are used:  
1) Non-resident workers income; and 2) transfers from residents of a given economy to 
residents of another (Yang 2011). The main independent variable is based on workers’ 
remittances and compensation of workers in current US dollars (World Bank 2014). The 
remittances are measured as a ratio to the GDP, making it possible to see the relative size of 
remittances as a part of the receiving country economy.   
 
3.4.3 Economic inequality 
There are different approaches to determine levels of economic inequality. As mentioned in 
chapter 2, the Gini index is the most common measure of income inequality and measures the 
degree of inequality in income distribution. The Gini index applied in this thesis is based on 
data from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2009). The 
existing Gini data gathered by the World Bank lacks coverage and most Sub-Saharan 
countries are not included in the data. This makes the data difficult to apply to a regression 
analysis, as it is not possible to significantly compare across observations. To counter this 
problem the SWIID database uses different sources to gather and standardize as much data on 
income and income inequality from different sources
6
, but at the same time avoiding 
potentially problematic assumptions by applying (when possible) information from proximate 
years in the same country. Intuitively, income inequality is a slow changing structure; 
therefore applying data from previous years (when in concordance with other data sources) 
                                                        
6
 SWIID consists of data from the following sources: The United Nations University’s World 
Income Inequality Database, the OECD Income Distribution Database, the Socio-Economic 
Database for Latin America and the Caribbean by CEDLAS and the World Bank, Eurostat, 
the World Banks PovcalNet, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the World Top Incomes Database and different national statistical offices around 
the globe (Solt 2009).  
 35 
should prove less problematic. The data found in the Luxembourg Income Study is used as 
the standard (Solt 2009).  
 
A Gini coefficient of zero indicates perfect equality, a country where all incomes are the 
same. A Gini coefficient of hundred indicates maximum inequality. The Gini index 
oversimplifies, as the absolute and relative levels of inequality are hard to measure. There are 
also demographic issues with the index, as countries with a young population enrolled in 
higher education would seem to have lower levels of income equality, even if these persons 
would later go on to well-paid jobs after getting degrees. It is still possible to ascertain general 
trends and is useful for the purpose of this thesis.  
 
3.4.4 Endogeneity bias 
Intuitively, countries with high levels of economic inequality might see an exodus of migrants 
seeking better economic opportunities abroad. This inequality induced exodus would in turn 
lead to transmissions of remittances, making the two main independent variables determined 
by each other, so-called simultaneity (Brockwell & Davis 1991).   
Remittances and economic inequality will therefore not only have a relationship with the 
dependent variable, but it is also likely there exists a relationship between the two.  
 
If an endogenous relationship exists between migrant remittances and economic inequality, the 
benchmark model results would be sensitive to it. It is therefore important to determine if the 
causal inferences are a result of such an endogeneity bias. Fixed-effects models are common to 
use in testing for possible endogeneity bias (Li & Schaub 2004). This is done through two-step 
estimation. The method used for correcting the possible endogeneity issue is also likely to 
reduce the efficiency of the estimators, and is therefore not included in the benchmark model 
but rather tested separately in models 6 (see Table 3. and 4.). Running an endogenized version 
of the remittance variable (based on residuals from the fixed-effects model) should reveal 
whether the findings in model 1 are affected by any endogeneity. Testing for the presence of 
endogeneity bias will be presented in-depth in chapter 4.  
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Table 1: Descriptive, continuous variables 
Variables N Min Max Mean Std.Dev 
Remittances 3,747 0 106.47 3.513 7.660 
Gini 3,711 14.559 80.785 38.155 10.838 
Trade 4,859 0.309 562.060 81.687 50.719 
FDI 4,613 -82.89 145.202 3.184 6.502 
ln(GDP per capita) 4,094 3.913 11.315 7.883 1.601 
GDP per capita
2 
4,094 15.311 128.003 64.711 25.730 
Ethnic fractionalization 4,992 0 0.930 0.451 0.262 
Religious fractionalization 5,022 0.002 0.860 0.433 0.239 
ln(population) 5,557 10.493 21.014 15.587 1.880 
 
 
   Table 2. Descriptive, dummy coding of COW variable 
Variables Frequencies Percent 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1395 25.01 
America 1022 18.32 
Asia 1085 19.45 
Europe 1394 24.99 
MENA (Middle East & North 
Africa)* 
682 12.23 
Total 5578 100 
*Middle East held as reference category 
 
3.4.5 Economic inflows 
The transmission of remittances is one of the largest global financial transmissions, but there 
are also other economic inflows that are important to control for. All economic variables 
included in the models are from the World Bank (2014).  
 
Trade is the annual sum of imports and exports in goods and service within a country as a 
share of the gross domestic product. Measures the openness of a country’s economy to trade 
flows. Terrorist groups have been known to trade contraband on the international markets to 
fund their operations and as globalization increases these transactions have become 
increasingly less dangerous and less likely to be stopped (Matthew & Shambaugh 1998). 
 
Foreign direct investments represent the net inflows of foreign investments into the economy, 
as a ratio of the country’s GDP. The FDI stock of a country also indicates the degree of 
openness of the country to foreign capital and economic mobility. The volume of foreign 
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direct investments has increased dramatically over the last two decades, from $180 billion in 
the late 1980s and to $1.85 trillion in 2008 (Oatley 2012[2006]). As FDI flows into a 
country’s economy increases, the assumption is that prosperity increases as well. This in turn 
decreases the peoples grievances and reduces the likelihood of groups attempting to shake the 
status quo through violence (Mascarenhas & Sandler 2013). Poor economic development and 
a lack of integration into the globalized economy can induce perfect conditions for terrorists 
seeking to recruit (Johnston 2001).  
Gross domestic product (GDP): The causal relationship between economic development and 
terrorist events is a complex one. The idea that economic development influences the 
occurrence of terrorism has been greatly studied but there results are unclear on the causal 
relationship between the two. According to Collier, slow economic growth is important in 
explaining the occurrence of rebellion or violence (2006). It is important to note that Collier 
focuses on civil war, not terrorism, as a manifestation of political violence. Terrorism may 
occur during civil war, but it need not. Other studies indicate that there is no empirical 
evidence to support the “rooted-in-poverty” thesis and a direct connection between poverty 
and terrorism (Piazza 2006: Krueger & Malecková 2003; Taylor 1988). 
 
While poverty on an individual level might not be associated with terrorism, there is still the 
possibility that it might matter on a national level. As Krueger and Malecková point out, the 
relationship between transnational terrorism and economic development should therefore also 
be assessed using a cross-country analysis (2003). An impoverished country with low GDP 
might still see a minority take to violence as a way of improving their conditions. This is also 
found in Collier’s study (2006), where the risk of political conflict is higher in countries with 
low incomes. There is a distinct possibility of poverty influencing the occurrence of terrorism. 
A metastudy done by Gassebner and Luechingers, based on 43 different studies, using a 
variety of combinations of 65 variables in 13.4 million different regressions, found nothing to 
indicate a causal relationship between terrorism and per capita GDP (2011). As suggested by 
Enders and Hoover’s (2012) study on the non-linear relationship between terrorism and GDP 
per capita, there is a clear degree of curvilinearity in the causal relationship between the two.  
 
To test for the possibility of such a causal relationship existing (or not existing) a GDP per 
capita variable has been included. The variable should be able to test for possible links 
between poverty/low economic efficiency and terrorism.  All the economic indicators have 
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been lagged one year behind the dependent variables, giving the economic factors time to 
manifest within a country. 
3.4.6 Regime type 
The effect of regime type on the occurrence of political violence has been covered extensively 
by previous research (Wade 2007; Wilson & Piazza 2013). The two main schools of thought, 
political access and resource mobilization, have competing views on how regime influences 
the occurrence of terrorist events, but both contend that regime characteristics have an impact 
on terrorism.  
 
The political access school views democracy as a tool for ensuring representation and (more 
importantly) a feeling of efficacy for the people. Democracies are viewed as a mechanism that 
institutionalizes political action in orderly forms and through this makes terrorism 
unnecessary. The institutionalized channels gives people the possibility to influence policy 
concerns through peaceful means rather than through political violence (Eyerman 1998). This 
view has been criticized for conflating democracy with political access, as democracy is not a 
sufficient to ensure political access and feelings of efficacy in groups (Brooks 2009). 
 
The competing perspective, the resource mobilization view, contends that open societies such 
as democracies are more prone to political violence. Li (2005) claims that political access, 
instead of ensuring less terrorist activity, actually creates more. Democratic regimes are 
characterized by freedom of speech and free press, which can give terrorists the platform they 
seek for broadcasting their message. Proponents of this view claim that democracies are 
especially vulnerable to political violence because people are more likely to express open 
dissent, both non-violent and violent (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates & Gleditsch 2001). Autocractic 
regimes are able to suppress dissent and disagreements, and thus avoid the issue of political 
violence, even in the face of grievances amongst the populace (Muller & Weede 1990). While 
autocratic regimes can use any means necessary to hinder violent attacks, democracies are 
bound by certain standards that make it hard to stop political violence. Previous studies also 
lend support to this school of thought (Piazza 2007; Eubank & Weinberg 2001; Eubank & 
Weinberg 1998).  
 
The regime variable is from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2013). The 
combined polity score (Polity2) has been modified to ensure standardization of all years so 
that they can be combined and used in a time-series analysis. The variable is a unified polity 
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scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). There are also 
indications of a non-linear relationship between political violence and regime type (Abadie 
2004). In effect, terrorists are more likely to mobilize in countries that are undergoing a 
democratic transition, so-called anocracies (Hegre et al. 2001; Ellingsen & Gleditsch 1997). 
Autocratic regimes moving towards democracy will see an uptick in violence before the 
increase in political freedom leads to a sharp decrease in political violence. Regimes that 
score in the middle ranges on the democracy-autocracy index, anocratic regimes, are more 
prone to political violence (Russet & ONeal 2001; Hegre et al. 2001). The transformation 
from an autocratic to a democratic regime could possible lead to long-simmering tensions 
rising to the surface, as an explanation for the curvilinear effect. To control for the possibility 
of such a relationship existing a squared term of the regime measure has also been included.  
There are few studies done on whether this curvilinear relationship also exists when looking 
at the terrorists’ country of origin. The transnational attacks are coded to look at the country 
of origin, rather than country where the attack takes place, which means the same U-shaped 
relationship, might not exist. A curvilinear relationship is more likely to manifest when 
looking the domestic terrorism.  
 
3.4.7 Ethno-religious fractionalization 
Group identity and identification is an important aspect of mobilization. Previous studies have 
shown that a common identity is necessary for a group to form (Gurr 1994; Tilly 1978; 
Ellingsen 2000). By creating an in-group, there is at the same time a automatic exclusion of 
those not belonging to the group. 
 
Ethnicity and religious identification are seen as two of the most important identities and is 
what Ellingsen calls fundamental factor (2000). These fundamental factors are particularly 
conflict prone as they are often viewed as more important than for example traditional 
national borders. Previous studies have found that ethnic fractionalization increases the risk of 
terrorism, in the case of domestic terrorism (Foster, Braithwaite & Sobek 2013).  
 
Religious fractionalization has also been controlled for, as it has many of the same functions 
as ethnicity in creating and reaffirming group unity (Juergensmeyer 1996). 
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Religious views are also a central component of individual and group identity, shaping its 
followers worldview. Religious and fractionalization is often included in terrorism studies
7
 to 
control for this identity effect. Fractionalized states, in which competing worldviews and 
identities are prevalent, experience more terrorist attacks than ethnically homogenous 
societies (Skjoldberg & Nordås 2007; Malecková 2005). On the other hand, studies have also 
found that religiously fractionalized societies have lower levels of attacks than homogenous 
societies (Bandyopadhyay & Younas 2009).  
 
To control for ethnic and religious fractionalization the model has variables on ethnic and 
religious fractionalization. The fractionalization variables included in the thesis dataset is 
from Alesina et al (2003). The variable is based on the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) 
index
8
. The index gives the likelihood of two randomly chosen individuals within a country 
belonging to the same ethnic group, based on values between 0 and 1. 
 
The ELF index measures ethnic diversity using a minus 1 decrease of the Herfindahl 
concentration index (Bossert, D’Ambrosio & Ferrara 2005). If we have a society composed of 
K≥2 different ethnic groups, the pk represents the share of group k in the entire population, 
giving the ELF index value by:  
                                                                                                            (1) 
 
The ethnic fractionalization variable ranges between 0 and 1. Higher numbers indicate a 
higher probability that two randomly chosen persons from the same country belong to 
different ethnic groups. In effect, countries with higher disaggregation of ethnic groups will 
be closer to 1, while countries with larger ethnic groups will be closer to 0. The religious 
fractionalization variable is coded the same, the closer to 1, the more likely that the two 
chosen individuals from the same country are members of different religious groupings. There 
                                                        
7 Abadie 2004; Krueger & Laitin 2008; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Basuchoudary & Shughart 
2010; Krieger & Meierrieks 2011; Blomberg & Hess 2008 
8
 The ELF index is based on the concentration index developed by Herfindahl and Hirschman. 
The index functions as a measure of concentration and was originally an index to measure the 
number of firms within a market. When calculating the ELF index it is the relative size of 
ethnic groups rather than firms (Kelly 1981). 
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are also other possible ways of measuring group belonging within a society that also takes 
into account feelings of marginalization and polarization
9
  
 
3.4.8 Other control variables 
Population size 
A variable that measures the size of the population has been included (World Bank 2014). 
Larger countries are often highly heterogeneous, which can lead to feelings of alienation 
amongst subgroups that in turn resort to violence (Li & Schaub 2004). Countries with sizable 
populations are also more likely to have terrorist events as a result of the difficulties in 
policing a larger population (Chenoweth 2010; Eyerman 1998). The variable has been lagged 
one year and logged.   
 
Past terrorist activity (lagged dependent variable)  
Terrorist groups have a tendency to continue their operations within a given country rather 
than move, as a result of cost considerations (Li & Schaub 2004). It is therefore natural to 
assume that countries that produce terrorists will continue to do so. The activity of one group 
might encourage activity from others in the form of inspiration and copycats. Midlarsky, 
Crenshaw and Yoshida call this “the contagion process” (1980). The activity of one group 
might inspire future activities of other persons or groups within the same state, creating a 
contagion of terrorist mobilization within a country. The first terrorist event can therefore be 
seen as the heralding of a radicalization process within a single country. Likewise, countries 
that do not have any terrorist activity may continue to experience the absence of terrorist 
activity over time. 
 
                                                        
9 Esteban and Ray (1994) define polarization as the sum total of interpersonal “antagonisms”. 
These antagonisms are a results of two factors; 1) the sense of group identification (group 
size) and; 2) feelings of alienation from other groups (intergroup distance). By measuring the 
levels of polarization, it becomes possible to discern the conflict potential of existing 
structural differences between groupings (Østby 2008). The b is the intergroup distance and 𝜎 
captures the level of group identification and functions as a (positive) parameter:  
𝑃(𝜎,b) = ∑ ∑ 𝑛𝑖
  1+ 𝜎𝑛𝑗𝑏𝑗𝑖
𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
 
 42 
Including a lagged term of the dependent variable is also helpful in controlling for possible 
effects of relevant but omitted structural variables, as well as dealing with any serial 
correlation in the error term. The use of a lagged dependent variable as a modeling strategy is 
becoming increasingly accepted within political science studies (Beck & Katz 1995; Burkhart 
& Lewis-Beck 1994; Li & Schaub 2004). Wilkins article on the lagging of dependent 
variables also suggests that a theoretically funded inclusion of the dependent variable gives 
the best estimates of the effect of the independent variable (2013).  
 
Ongoing conflict 
The truism “conflict breeds more conflict” has many historical examples, from the Russian 
Revolution following on the heels of World War I, as well as more modern examples such as 
the war in Iraq. What began as a US-led invasion is today a civil war fought between different 
factions. Ongoing conflicts are a good indicator of potential violence and have therefore been 
included (Lutz & Lutz 2004). The data on ongoing conflicts is from the Uppsala Armed 
Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The variable has been dummy coded, identifying 
whether conflict was present (1) or not present (0) and then lagged one year.  
 
Regional dummies 
Previous studies have found regional differences when it comes to degree of vulnerability to 
terrorists, as certain areas are more prone to see the emergence of terrorists and this is 
unevenly distributed spatially (Li & Schaub 2004; Global Terrorism Index 2012). To control 
for these systematic differences across regions, regional dummy variables have been 
constructed: Sub-Saharan Africa (referred to as Africa), Asia, Europe, America and Middle 
East & North Africa (MENA). MENA is used as a reference category and has been excluded 
from the models. 
 
3.5 Outliers  
It is difficult to discern outliers using Negative binomial regression, as traditional procedures 
such as Cook’s distance and similar outlier detectors are not useful and is likely to produce 
(Hilbe 2007). Hilbe suggest using standardized Pearson’s residual when studying outliers in 
count model data (2007). The Pearson residuals provide a good measure of fit and indicate 
how good the observations are predicted by the model. By plotting the standardized residuals 
against the main explanatory variables we should be able to detect potential outliers (see 
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Appendix A.8-11). Studying the outliers’ reveal that certain countries (Nigeria, Ireland, 
Panema) are overrepresented as outliers. Their removal does not significantly change the 
results of the benchmark model. Re-running the benchmark model after filtering out any 
Pearson residuals with a value above 2 only weakens the model, without significantly 
impacting the results. There are therefore few indications that the outliers exert any high 
degree of influence. The outliers are left in the models.  
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Note: OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1 
 
 
Table 3. Negative binomial regression. Transnational terrorist events, remittances and economic inequality. 1980-2005. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Remittances  0.034**  0.030***  0.023**  0.034**  0.031**  0.037**  0.185*** 
GINI  0.026**    0.020*  0.024**  0.021**  0.026**  0.033** 
Trade -0.011** -0.009**  -0.013** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** 
FDI -0.081** -0.055*** -0.103***   -0.082** -0.081** -0.083** 
ln(GDP per capita)  0.166**  0.073  0.155*  0.186**   0.166**  0.192 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.193 -0.113 -0.294 -0.128 -0.232 -0.193 -0.138 
Religious fractionalization -3.039** -2.203** -2.998** -3.112** -2.373* -3.039** -3.392** 
Religious fractionalization
2
  2.897**  1.751  2.711**  2.817**  2.343*  2.897**  3.481** 
ln(SIZE)  0.124*  0.173**  0.261***  0.118*  0.127*  0.124*  0.128* 
Ongoing conflict  0.730***  0.842***  0.777***  0.734***  0.713***  0.730***  0.752*** 
Previous event  0.027***  0.027***  0.276***  0.028***  0.027***  0.027***  0.027*** 
Regime -0.011 -0.003 -0.012 -0.132  0.002 -0.011 -0.014 
Africa -1.537** -0.928** -1.301** -1.462** -1.792*** -1.537** -1.523** 
America -0.618* -0.183 -0.369 -0.698** -0.658* -0.618* -0.597* 
Asia -0.853** -0.692** -0.888** -0.829** -1.070*** -0.853** -0.811** 
Europe -0.566* -0.476 -0.618* -0.608* -0.478 -0.566* -0.585* 
Non-OECD       -0.595 
Non-OECD x remittances       -0.152** 
Non-OECD x GINI       -0.012 
Constant -3.639** -2.871* -6.190*** -3.560** -2.040 -3.643** -3.987** 
Observations 2001 2426 2003 2041 2022 2001 2001 
Wald test (X2) 445.79*** 541.77*** 427.40*** 479.08*** 395.06*** 445.79*** 499.42** 
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4 Results 
Chapter 4 discusses the results of the empirical models. The focus will first be on the result of 
the benchmark model (model 1), before testing the robustness of the findings in models 2-7. 
The exclusion of explanatory variables increases the understanding of how they correlate with 
each other and impact the results in the benchmark model. The chapter first presents the 
findings from the transnational models (Table 3.), before moving on to the domestic models 
(Table 4.) and a final summary of the main findings.  
 
4.1 Transnational terrorism 
We will begin by studying the results from the benchmark model (model 1, Table 3.). Models 
2 through 7 test the robustness of the benchmark results. Model 2 will first exclude economic 
inequality to control for its effects on the results. Li and Schaub (2010) suggest that a 
collinear relationship might exist between trade, FDI and economic development (in the form 
of GDP per capita). The economic variables are therefore sequentially excluded from models 
3-5 to control for this. Model 6 controls for the possibility of an endogeneity bias. As 
mentioned previously, there is a possibility of the remittance variable being endogenous to the 
economic inequality variable, as remittance inflows might themselves be the result of pre-
existing economic inequality. 
 
Model 7 controls for the possibility that the effect of remittances differs between developed 
countries and less-developed countries. To determine this two additional variables have been 
included in model 7: a dummy variable for non-OECD countries, where non-OECD countries 
have been coded 1 and OECD countries are 0; and an interaction term between the non-
OECD variable and remittances. The interaction term has been included to discern any 
differences between countries with different economic policies and ideological views. Two of 
the main criteria for OECD membership are a focus on democratic principles and promotion 
of market economics (Noboru 2004).   
 
4.1.1 Benchmark model 
In model 1 the dispersion parameter delta is 6.54, indicating overdispersion. As the 
conditional variance of the transnational terrorist count variable exceeds its conditional mean, 
the choice to use Negative binomial regression instead of Poisson regression is justified.  
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The Wald chi square test is also statistically significant at a 1% level, indicating a good model 
fit for the benchmark model.   
 
Remittances and economic inequality 
The key independent variable in our model, lagged remittances (REMITTANCES), is 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the remittance variable, as a percentage of the 
GDP, is positively related to the mobilization of transnational terrorist groups or individuals. 
A 1% increase in the remittance transmissions into a country increases the expected number 
of terrorist attacks with 3.4%. This supports H1. 
 
Figure 6. Margins plot: remittances 
 
The economic inequality variable (GINI) is significant at the 5% level and also positively 
associated with higher expected numbers of transnational terrorists stemming from a country. 
With every 1 point increase on the Gini index, the expected number of transnational terrorist 
originating from the country grows by 2,6%. This suggests a significant relationship between 
the economic inequality and transnational terrorism mobilization, lending support to H4.  
 
Other economic variables  
Model 1 also includes other economic variables, used to control for the impact of the two 
main explanatory variables of remittances and economic inequality.  
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade (TRADE) both have significant negative 
relationship with the dependent variable, at the 1% and 5% level respectively. A strong trade 
and FDI flow into a country significantly lowers the risk of terrorists mobilizing from that 
country. A 1% increase in a country’s trade (export and import) decreases the expected 
number of terrorist attacks from that country with 2.3%.  
 
A 1% increase in FDIs into a country decreases the expected number of transnational terrorist 
attacks coming out of that country with 4.6%. The percentages are small, but the possibility of 
closer economic ties (through economic globalization and investments) clearly has an impact 
on the existence of terrorist attacks and increased economic ties with terrorist prone countries 
could therefore be expected to decrease terrorist mobilization. An example of this is if trade, 
as a percentage of GDP, grows with 10%. If a country’s trade sector increased with 10% the 
expected number of transnational terrorist events originating from that country would 
decrease with 11%
10
.  
 
Figure 7. Margins plot: economic inequality 
 
 
 
                                                        
10
 Trade IRR = 0.9886512^10 = 0.8912  
    1-0.89= 11 = 11% 
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The GDP per capita variable (GDP) is significant in the benchmark model. The results 
indicate that countries with a higher GDP per capita are associated with higher expected 
numbers of transnational terrorist mobilizing within that country. Previous studies on the 
causal relationship between economic development and terrorism have proved inconclusive, 
with some studies finding some evidence for the “rooted in poverty” hypothesis, while other 
studies have not found any indications of a relationship. The results indicate that wealthy, 
well-developed countries are at greater risk of creating potential transnational terrorist, more 
so than countries “rooted in poverty”. There is some evidence in previous research of similar 
findings (Krueger & Laitin 2007). The possibility of a curvilinear relationship was also tested 
but not found significant.  
 
Figure 8. Margins plot: GDP per capita 
 
 
Control variables  
The ethnic fractionalization variable (ETHNIC) is not significant in the benchmark model.  
To control the lack of significance a squared term was included for the ethnic fractionalization 
variable, but as it was not significant it has not been included in the final model.   
Religious fractionalization (RELIGIOUS) and its squared term are on the other hand 
significant, indicating that there is a curvilinear relationship between the dependent variable 
and religious fractionalization.  
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The variable is a significant determinant of terrorism in model 1 and significant at the 1% 
level. Any preexisting conflict is related to the existence of terrorists or terrorist groups. The 
results find that preexisting conflicts within a territory increases the expected number of 
transnational terrorist attacks from that country with 108%. Countries that are already rife 
with unrest are more likely to produce terrorists or terrorist groups. These results are in 
concordance with previous research that has found pre-existing conflict to be good indicators 
of terrorist presence.  
 
The variable for previous terrorist activity (PREVIOUS EVENT) is significant at the 1% 
level. This lends credence to Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida’s “contagion process” (1980), 
where a country with a terrorist presence will have a higher expected number of terrorists in 
the future. The significant relationship between the dependent variable and previous terrorist 
activity is such that it is meaningful to talk of “terrorist prone” countries. Terrorist attacks are 
rare but countries where previous attacks have come from are risk countries and are more 
likely to produce terrorists in the future. The expected number of transnational terrorists 
stemming from a country rises with 2.7% for every previous attack.  
 
The REGIME variable is not significant, indicating that regime type does not influence the 
existence of terrorist or terrorist groups within a country. Intuitively, more democratic 
regimes are less likely to produce grievances that could potentially turn violent.  Democratic 
regimes that are able to respond to grievances and improve have been found to experience 
fewer terrorist events (Li 2005) To control for the possibility of the inverted U-shaped, 
curvilinear relationship, mentioned by Abadie (2004), a squared term was tested but not found 
significant. This is not consistent with previous research. While the studies differ on whether 
democracies have a negative or positive impact on the occurrence of terrorist attacks, the 
association has been found to be significant (Li & Schaub 2004; Eubank & Weinberg 1994). 
The lack of a significant association between regime type and the dependent variable might be 
explained by the fact that the regression is studying terrorists’ countries of origin rather than 
the venue country. A country’s regime is therefore not significant in explaining the 
mobilization of transnational terrorists or terrorist groupings. The regime type might be 
important when looking at the venue of attack but not necessarily when studying the countries 
where the terrorists mobilize.  
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The logged variable for the total population (SIZE) of a country is positive and significantly 
associated with transnational terrorism. A 1% increase in the size of a population increases 
the expected number of terrorist events stemming from that country by 13%. Countries with 
large populations are more likely to produce terrorists or terrorist groups that commit 
transnational terrorism. This is consistent with previous literature that found the same 
relationship between large populations and an increased risk of terrorist events (Eyerman 
1998; Chenoweth 2010; Li & Schaub 2004).  
 
The regional variables should control for possible regional variations in the spread of 
transnational terrorist mobilization. The results indicate that the geographical distribution of 
transnational terrorists is highly significant. There are significantly fewer terrorists mobilizing 
from all other continents, relative to the MENA region. Africa experiences 79% fewer 
transnational terrorists mobilizing from the region; Europe 43%; America 46%; and Asia 
57%. These results indicate that the MENA region is more prone to produce transnational 
terrorists, than other regions.  
 
4.1.2 Model variations and robustness checks 
The economic inequality variable (GINI) is excluded from MODEL 2, without greatly 
affecting the other main independent variable, remittances (as a percentage of GDP). 
Remittances inflows are still significant, as well as the economic variables trade and FDI. The 
only economic factor influenced by the exclusion of economic inequality from the model is 
the logged GDP per capita variable. In the benchmark model GDP per capita was a significant 
explanatory variable, but this is not the case in MODEL 2. There are clear indications that the 
GDP per capita is correlated to economic inequality, as the explanatory power of economic 
development is weakened considerably and is no longer significant.  
The control variables remain largely unchanged, with the exception of religious 
fractionalization, which is no longer significant. There are also significant changes in the 
regional dummies when economic inequality is excluded. Neither Europe, nor America is 
significant, while Asian and African countries still mobilize significantly less transnational 
terrorists than the MENA region.   
 
MODEL 3 excludes one of the economic control variables, trade. The exclusion of trade has 
not significantly impacted any of the inference made in the benchmark model about the two 
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main independent variables, remittances and economic inequality. The lagged remittance 
variable and the Gini coefficient are both still positive and statistically significant.  
 
The other economic variables, FDI and GDP per capita, are both still significant. Increased 
foreign direct investments into a country’s economy are negatively associated with 
transnational terrorist mobilization. Increased economic development, in the form of 
increased GDP per capita, still has a positive impact on the expected number of transnational 
terrorist attacks stemming from a country.   
 
The control variables remain unchanged in MODEL 3, with the exception of one regional 
variable. There is no longer any significant difference between MENA and the Americas 
when it comes to mobilizing transnational terrorists. The lack of significance for the Americas 
variable suggests that when trade relations are not considered the explanatory power of the 
variable is significantly weakened.  
 
MODEL 4 removes FDI from the model. Remittances are still positive and significantly 
associated with expected increases in transnational terrorists within a country. None of the 
other economic variables differ significantly from the results in the benchmark model. 
Economic inequality is still significant and higher levels of inequality are positively linked to 
higher expected of transnational terrorists stemming from a country.  
The significance levels of the other control variables remain unchanged from model 1 and 
with only minor changes to their coefficients, with the exception being the regional dummy 
variable for Europe, which is not significant when the FDI variable is excluded.  
 
The final economic variable, the logged GDP per capita, is excluded from MODEL 5. The 
exclusion does not have a significant impact on the two main independent variables, with both 
remittances and economic inequality remaining positive and significant, both at the 5% level.  
MODEL 6 aims to control for the possibility of an endogeneity bias. The first step requires 
running a two-way, fixed-effects model with the remittance variable being regressed on Gini, 
trade, FDI, the lagged dependent variable and dummies for country and year. The robust 
standard errors are estimated. The results of the fixed-effects model are included in the 
appendix (A.5).  
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After running the fixed-effect model, the predicted value of the remittance variable is 
calculated and substituted into the benchmark model (model 1). Running the negative 
binomial regression again finds that the significance does not differ from the original 
benchmark model.  The main independent variables still have a positive impact on terrorist 
mobilization and remain statistically significant. The results, found in model 6 indicate that 
the inference made in the benchmark model is not influenced by any endogeneity bias. The 
coefficients in model 6 differ only slightly from the benchmark and the main independent 
variables, remittances and economic inequality, remain significant. There are therefore no 
indications that the results obtained in the benchmark were influenced by an endogenous 
relationship between the two main independent variables. 
 
Figure 9. Interaction plot: OECD and remittances 
 
 
The two interaction terms are included in MODEL 7, in addition to the non-OECD dummy. 
As the remittance variable is the main effect variable they can only indicate the effect of 
remittances on non-OECD countries, while the interaction term measures how remittances 
differ going into non-OECD countries compared to OECD countries.  
  
The interaction term between non-OECD countries and remittances is negative and 
statistically significant. These results indicate that non-OECD countries that receive 
remittances have a lower expected rate of transnational terrorist than OECD countries that 
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receive remittances. The interaction plot (Fig.9) highlights how the impact of remittances 
differs between OECD and non-OECD countries. Initially both OECD and non-OECD 
countries are close to equal, but as the percentage of remittances into the country increase, the 
predicted number of transnational events from that country increases more drastically in 
OECD countries. Remittances also impact non-OECD countries but to a slighter degree than 
OECD countries. The control variable for regime type has lacked significance in many of the 
models. The significant interaction term between remittances and non-OECD might indicate 
that regime type alone does not have an impact. It might be rather that the economic structure 
of a country and other ideological preferences might play an important role. 
 
The non-OECD and Gini interaction term included is statistically insignificant. The lack of 
significance indicates that there is no difference between OECD and non-OECD states in how 
economic inequality influences the occurrence of transnational terrorists. Economic inequality 
increases the mobilization of transnational terrorists in both developed and less-developed 
countries.  
 
4.1.3 Summary of transnational models 
The main independent variables, remittances and economic inequality are significant across 
all models, with the coefficients remaining positive. These findings imply a possible use of 
remittances as an auxiliary source of terrorist funding, or at least that countries with high 
levels of remittance inflows experience increased numbers of transnational terrorists 
mobilizing. High levels of economic inequality are also associated with increased presence of 
transnational terrorists. This lends support to H1 and H4. 
 
The other economic variables also remain relatively stable, with both trade and FDI remaining 
significant and negatively associated with transnational terrorism. The GDP per capita was 
significant in the benchmark model, but its insignificance in model 2. GDP became 
insignificant once economic inequality was excluded, which might indicate that some of its 
explanatory power is a result of correlation with the economic inequality variable.  Economic 
inequality is not dependent on GDP per capita, as it remains significant in model 5 even when 
GDP is excluded. 
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Note: OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.
Table 4. Negative binomial regression. Domestic terrorist events, remittances and economic inequality. 1980-2005.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Remittances  0.002  0.008 -0.003  0.001 -0.003  0.000  0.039 
GINI/ Economic inequality  0.015**   0.016**  0.016**  0.019**  0.017**  0.034** 
Trade -0.006** -0.004*  -0.008*** -0.004** -0.006** -0.005** 
FDI -0.063***  -0.049*** -0.073***  -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.063*** 
ln(GDP per capita)  1.266**   1.379**  0.961*  1.191**   1.254**  1.194** 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -0.074** -0.080** -0.053 -0.068*  -0.071** -0.068* 
Ethnic fractionalization -3.791** -3.918** -3.526** -3.954** -3.389** -3.877** -3.290** 
Ethnic fractionalization
2 
 4.391**  4.298**  3.937**  4.696**  3.743**  4.348**  3.689* 
Religious fractionalization
 
-3.896**  -3.044** -4.020** -4.050** -3.411** -4.074** -4.509*** 
Religious fractionalization
2 
 4.808**   3.580**  4.946***  4.822**  4.379**  5.102**  5.726*** 
ln(population size)  0.174***   0.209***  0.231***  0.172***  0.164***  0.166***  0.158*** 
Ongoing conflict  0.968***  0.883***  0.845***  0.944***  0.813***  0.843***  0.859*** 
Previous event  0.020***  0.006***  0.006***  0.021***  0.006***  0.006***  0.006*** 
Regime  0.027   0.024  0.015  0.025  0.020  0.015  0.016 
Africa -0.733* -0.084 -0.664* -0.716* -1.066** -0.694* -0.738** 
America -0.369  0.126 -0.308 -0.472 -0.396 -0.412 -0.125 
Asia -0.289  0.054 -0.403 -0.290 -0.565* -0.327 -0.408 
Europe -0.140  0.096 -0.216 -0.212 -0.165 -0.147 -0.320 
Non-OECD       -0.612 
Non-OECD x remittances       -0.038 
Non-OECD x GINI       -0.019 
Constant -8.360** -9.007*** -8.572*** -8.126** -2.879*** -8.752*** -8.106** 
Observations  1924  2387  1963  1964  1981  1960 1960 
Wald test (X2) 647.61*** 896.75*** 836.63*** 619.92*** 657.67*** 770.43*** 894.42*** 
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4.2 Domestic terrorism  
Table 4 presents the empirical model for domestic terrorist events. Using the same modeling 
technique as the transnational models, models 2-7 will apply alternative model specifications 
to test the robustness of the results from model 1. Models 2-5 will sequentially exclude the 
economic variables to test how they correlate and impact the dependent variable, before 
controlling for endogeneity bias in model 6.  
 
4.2.1 Benchmark model 
The domestic terrorism count data is also overdispersed, evidenced by the dispersion 
parameter (delta) in the benchmark model at 61.4. To handle the overdispersion negative 
binomial regression is the correct choice for the domestic dependent variable as well.  
The Wald test for the benchmark model is significant at the 1% level, indicating good model 
fit for the domestic benchmark model as well.  
 
Remittances and economic inequality 
Moving on to the independent variables included in model 1, the lagged remittance coefficient 
(REMITTANCES) is positive but not significant, indicating that greater influxes of 
remittance funds are not associated with higher rates of domestic terrorist events. The lack of 
significance stands in contrast to what we expected to find and contradicts H2. Based on the 
previous study done on remittances and domestic terrorism (Mascarenhas & Sandler 2013), a 
strong significant relationship between the two was expected. This was not found between 
remittances and domestic terrorist events. The lack of significance might be a result of the 
domestic terrorist groups structure and internal financing rather than financing from abroad.  
 
Economic inequality (GINI) is positive and significant at the 5% level, supporting H5. High 
levels of economic inequality are significantly related to higher expected domestic terrorism 
rates. A one-point increase on the Gini index leads to an estimated 2% increase in domestic 
terrorist attacks. While a 2% increase may appear to make only a minor impact, the effect 
would increase as the level of economic inequality. A 10-point slide on the Gini index would 
lead to an estimated 17% increase in domestic attacks. 
 
These findings are lent credence in previous literature, which also found a significant link 
between high levels of economic inequality and increased domestic terrorist incidents 
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(Krieger & Meierrieks 2010; London and Robinson 1989; Muller and Seligson 1990). The 
significant relationship between the two also strengthens the role of relative deprivation as 
presented by Ted Gurr (1970). Relative deprivation in the form of economic inequality 
encourages increased domestic terrorism. 
 
Figure 10. Margins plot: economic inequality 
 
 
Other economic variables 
Other economic factors, such as trade ́ (TRADE) and foreign direct investment (FDI), are on 
the other hand negatively associated with domestic terrorist incidents. A country that partakes 
in the globalized economy through trade and foreign direct investments experience less 
domestic terrorism, indicating that deeper economic integration with other countries has a 
positive effect on decreasing domestic terrorism. For every 1% increase of trade as part of 
GDP, domestic terrorism incidences are reduced by 1%.  
 
FDI decreases the expected domestic terrorism rates by 7% for every 1% increase of FDI into 
the economy (through GDP). Mascarenhas & Sandler (2013) argue that allowing for stronger 
ties between a country and the rest of the world is important in hindering domestic terrorism. 
By allowing globalization and deeper integration in vulnerable economies, there might be a 
decrease in domestic terrorist activity.   
 60 
 
Figure 11. Margins plot: FDI 
 
 
The log transformed GDP per capita (GDP) variable (and the squared term) is significant, 
suggesting a curvilinear relationship between economic development and domestic terrorist 
incidents. Poor countries that experience increased economic development will initially be 
vulnerable to domestic terrorists, at least in a transitional period. As the GDP continues to 
increase this effect weakens, before becoming significant in decreasing the occurrence of 
domestic terrorism.  
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Figure 12. Curvilinear graph: GDP per capita 
 
 
Control variables 
Ethnic and religious fractionalization (ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS) both have a significant, 
curvilinear relationship with domestic terrorism. Religious fractionalization has nearly the 
exact same coefficient as ethnic fractionalization. Both the religious fractionalization variable 
and its squared term is significant, indicating the same curvilinear relationship with domestic 
terrorism as ethnic fractionalization had. Countries with many smaller minority groups, in 
effect extremely heterogeneous societies, have increased likelihood of domestic terrorist 
attacks.  
 
These findings are also support by previous research, which found that ethnically 
heterogeneous countries have an increased risk of civil war (Hegre et al.1998; Ellingsen 
2000). If we view civil war as another expression of political violence, there is reason to 
believe that countries with high ethnic heterogeneity are also at greater risk of domestic 
terrorism. The curvilinear nature of the relationship between ethnic and religious 
fractionalization and domestic terrorism corresponds with previous finding from Skjoldberg 
& Nordås (2007) and Malecková (2005).  
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Figure 13. Curvilinear graph: ethnic fractionalization 
 
 
The graph shows the U-shaped curvilinearity of the relationship. The expected number of 
domestic incidences decreases as the ethnic fractionalization moves towards 0.4. This makes 
it clear that countries without a strong ethnic majority and without very fragmented ethnic 
minorities are less likely to experience domestic terrorism. But as a society becomes 
increasingly fractionalized the number of terrorist events is likely to rise sharply.  
 
The size of a country’s population (SIZE) is positively associated with increased domestic 
terrorist attacks. A 1% increase in the size of a country’s population would give a 18% 
increase in the expected number of domestic terrorist events. This is consistent with prior 
expectations and conforms to Eyerman’s (1998) expectation that countries with larger 
population are harder to police and it is therefore easier for terrorist groups to operate within 
them. 
 
The ongoing conflict variable (CONFLICT) is also highly significant at the 1% level and 
positively associated with increased terrorist attacks. Countries with ongoing conflicts 
between groups are especially vulnerable to domestic terrorist attacks, with a 132% increase 
of expected domestic terrorist attacks within countries were an ongoing conflict is present.  
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Previous domestic attacks (EVENT) are statistically significant and positively associated with 
increased domestic terrorist attacks. States were terrorist activity already are present are at 
risk of persistent terrorist threat, while countries were terrorism is absent are likely to 
experience persistent absence. Li and Schaub theorize that this might be related to the rational 
behavior of terrorist who would have greater difficulties and expenses in setting up operations 
in a country where terrorism is rare or non-existent previously (2004).  
 
The regime variable (REGIME) is positive, but surprisingly not statistically significant. There 
are therefore no significant differences between democracies or autocracies when it comes to 
numbers of domestic terrorist events. While there are disagreements between the political 
access and the resource mobilization school of thought on whether democracies are conducive 
for increased or decreased terrorist attacks the results do not conform to either. The possibility 
of a curvilinear relationship, as suggested by Abadie (2004) has also been controlled for, 
without generating any statistically significant results. The lack of significance might also be 
explained simply by weak explanatory power, which renders the regime variable insignificant 
when other more important explanatory variables are present.  
 
The regional variables do not suggest any major geographical patterns when it comes to the 
occurrences of domestic terrorism. The MENA region is used as the reference group in the 
domestic models as well. Initially there seems to be no significant difference in the expected 
domestic terrorist attacks. The MENA region, America, Asia and Europe experience the same 
levels of terrorism, with only Africa experiencing fewer attacks. While the GTD Index (2012) 
and the Li and Schaub study found significant regional differences these have not manifested 
in the benchmark model. The lack of significance between the Middle East, America, Asia 
and Europe might be a result of the long time period and shifts in areas of instability. 
Cumulative, there are no significant differences between these four continents, but Africa 
experiences 50% fewer expected domestic attacks than the MENA region.  
 
4.2.2 Model variations and robustness checks 
Model 2 excludes economic inequality, but the results are largely unchanged from the 
benchmark model. The remittance variable remains insignificant. The other economic 
variables also remain unchanged, with trade and FDI decreasing the expected number of 
domestic terrorism. GDP per capita remains curvilinearly related to domestic terrorism.  
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The control variables remain largely unchanged as well, with the exception of the regional 
dummy for Africa and the regime variable. In model 1 Africa was the only region with a 
significantly lower expected rate of domestic terrorism. When economic inequality is 
removed so is the weak significance found in the benchmark model, indicating that the 
explanatory power of the regional variable was linked to economic inequality. The regime 
variable becomes significant at the 5% level when economic inequality is excluded. The 
explanatory power of regime is weak as it is not present in model 1, but once economic 
inequality is not included it becomes significant.  
 
Excluding the trade variable in MODEL 3 also removes the explanatory power of economic 
development (in the form of GDP). The GDP per capita variables previously significant 
curvilinear relationship with domestic terrorism is no longer present, indicating some degree 
of collinearity between trade and GDP per capita. This makes the statistical inferences made 
on trade and GDP per capita unreliable. The FDI remains statistically significant and 
negatively related to domestic terrorism, indicating that the results obtained in model 1 are 
correct.  
 
The two main independent variables, remittances and Gini, remain largely unchanged. 
Remittance inflows are still not a significant, while higher economic inequality is still 
associated with higher numbers of expected domestic terrorism. The inferences made on the 
control variables in model 1 remain unchanged and the regime variable that was significant in 
model 2 is once again insignificant.   
 
The FDI variable is excluded in MODEL 4.  Remittance inflows remain insignificant, while 
economic inequality is still significant and positively related to domestic terrorist attacks. The 
control variables are all statistically unchanged, with only minor changes to the coefficients.  
 
For MODEL 5 the GDP per capita variable (and its squared term) is excluded from the model.  
Both the remittance variable and economic inequality remain consistent with previous 
findings. The remittance variable remains insignificant, while economic inequality is still 
significant and the coefficient changes only slightly from model 1. Both trade and FDI remain 
consistent with the results from model 1.  
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The removal of the GDP variables strengthens the explanatory power of the regional dummy 
variables. Africa has been negatively associated with domestic terrorism. When GDP per 
capita is removed as an explanatory variable, Asia also becomes significant and negative. 
When the GDP per capita is excluded it is significant at the 10% level. Both America and 
Europe remain insignificant.  
 
The possibility of an endogeneity bias is also present when studying remittances and 
economic inequality in relation to domestic terrorism. MODEL 6 has therefore applied the 
same fixed-effect method seen in the transnational terrorism models previously.  Using the 
same predicted values garnered from the fixed-effects model in the transnational models, 
model 6 substitutes the remittance variable with the predicted values. The results indicate that 
the inferences made in model 1 are not influenced by endogeneity, as the findings are 
consistent with those in the benchmark model. Remittances remains insignificant, while high 
economic inequality has a positive relationship with expected increased domestic terrorism.  
The significance levels of all control variables remain the same, with only minor changes to 
the coefficients. There are therefore no indications that the results obtained from the 
benchmark model are sensitive to an endogenous relationship between remittances and 
economic inequality.  
 
MODEL 7 controls for the same interactions that were included in the transnational model. 
The remittances and non-OECD interaction term is included but not significant. As the 
remittance variable did not indicate any impact on the occurrence of domestic terrorism in the 
previous six models, this is expected. The economic inequality and non-OECD variable is not 
significant either, indicating that the impact of economic inequality on domestic terrorism 
does not differ between OECD and non-OECD countries.  Any differences in impact between 
developed and less-developed countries are therefore only apparent when looking at 
transnational terrorists.  
 
4.2.3 Summary of domestic models 
The remittance variable is insignificant across all 7 domestic models. The lack of significance 
was surprising and did not correspond with H2. This contradicts the findings by Mascarenhas 
and Sandler (2013), but can possibly be explained by the financial structure of domestic 
terrorist groups. Domestic terrorist groups differ from transnational terrorist groups such as 
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Al-Qaeda, in that they rely mainly on internal revenue funding, rather than support from 
abroad (Fenstermacher et al. 2010). Domestic terrorist groups have limited interest outside 
their own borders and funding would therefore be focused locally rather than abroad. If the 
funding is internal rather than external, remittances will not have any significant impact on the 
occurrence of domestic terrorism. Economic inequality is on the other hand significant across 
all model specifications, resulting in strong support for H5; economic inequality is a 
significant determinant of domestic terrorism 
 
4.3 Alternative models with year dummies 
The models in table 3 and 4 have model specifications aimed at controlling the robustness of 
the results. To further ensure these results we have included more extensive statistical controls 
to alternative models. The results can be seen in Table 6 and 7 (see Appendix.6-7). Dummy 
variables for all years have therefore been included to test for these potential year-specific 
effects. The inclusion of year dummies in these models was done to prevent spurious findings 
(Li & Schaub 2004; Dougherty 2002). Their inclusion might possibly create high levels of 
collinearity, but should still be included to see whether the findings in the benchmark models 
are robust. The results differ only slightly from the original results, with the inferences made 
on the main independent variables remaining unchanged. Trade becomes insignificant in 
dummy models but this might be explained by the fact that the year dummies steal a lot of the 
explanatory power, which has been evidenced before (Li & Schaub 2004).   
 
4.4 Main findings  
Remittances are found to have significant explanatory power on the occurrence of 
transnational terrorist and are positively associated with higher expected numbers of 
transnational terrorism across all models, indicating a great degree of robustness. This 
supports H1. In the case of domestic terrorism the remittance variable is not significant in any 
of the seven statistical models. There is therefore no indication of a significant causal 
relationship between remittances and domestic terrorism, which dissuades support for H2.  
The lack of support for H2 gives support to H3; as no significant relationship can be detected 
between domestic terrorism and remittances, the relationship between transnational terrorism 
and remittances will necessarily have stronger explanatory power.  The lack of significance 
between remittances and domestic terrorism is surprising, as the previous quantitative study 
conducted by Mascarenhas and Sandler (2013) on domestic terrorism and remittances had 
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found a significant relationship between them. The discrepancy might be explained by the 
difference in year parameters and the fact that domestic terrorism is often funded internally, 
rather than by external sources (Fenstermacher et al. 2010). 
 
Table 5 Summary of hypotheses results 
Hypotheses Supported Unsupported Table 
H1 Remittances into a country have 
a significant impact on the number 
of transnational terrorists. 
x  3 
H2 Remittances into a country have 
a significant impact on the number 
of domestic terrorist attacks. 
 x 4 
H3 The explanatory power of 
remittances will be strongest in the 
transnational models. 
x  3 
H4 High economic inequality 
within a country increases the 
number of transnational terrorist 
events stemming from that 
country. 
x  3 
 
H5 High economic inequality 
increases the number of domestic 
terrorist attacks. 
x  4 
 
Economic inequality was significantly associated with higher expected numbers of terrorism 
across all statistical models, both transnational and domestic. These findings give credence to 
H4 and H5 and support the hypothesis that economic inequality influences the occurrence of 
both domestic and transnational terrorism. These results are in accordance with previous 
studies that have found a significant association between terrorism and vertical inequalities 
such as economic inequality (Muller & Seligson 1990; London & Robinson 1989).  
 
The results from the other economic variables such as trade, FDI and GDP per capita are not 
as unambiguous as the main independent variables. The alternative models in Table 6 and 
 68 
Table 7 found a lack of significance for the trade variable when possible spurious time effects 
were controlled for. In the original models trade and foreign direct investments had a negative 
impact on the occurrence of terrorism, but this was less pronounced when the time dummy 
variables were included (see Appendix A.6-7). Trade was no longer significant, while foreign 
direct investment was only significant when studying domestic terrorist events. Investments 
into terrorist prone countries could therefore be a useful strategy in decreasing domestic 
terrorism, but is unlikely to yield results when looking at decreasing transnational terrorist and 
terrorist groups. A rise in economic development, in the form of increased GDP per capita, is 
also unlikely to detract transnational terrorists, but will in the long run decrease the number of 
domestic terrorist events. 
 
Fractionalization of ethnic and religious groups had a greater impact on domestic terrorists 
than on transnational ones. Countries with neither a homogenous nor heterogeneous minority 
demographic will experience less domestic terrorism, but increasingly fractionalized societies 
will experience a sharp rise in the number of domestic terrorism. Religious fractionalization 
experiences the same curvilinear relationship with the number of domestic attacks; a society 
that is neither religiously totally homogenous nor totally heterogeneous is less likely to 
experience domestic terrorist attacks. Religious fractionalization also has an impact on the 
occurrence of transnational terrorism.  
 
The sensitivity of the benchmark models was controlled for in subsequent models, in an 
attempt to alleviate any uncertainty about the original inferences. The economic control 
variables and other control variables are consistent with previous studies and literature and the 
results of consistent across models, with only minor changes. To ensure that the findings for 
remittances and economic inequality are not influenced by an endogenous relationship, both 
statistical models have controlled the robustness of their benchmark models and included a 
check for possible endogeneity bias. As no such bias was found in either model, the 
inferences drawn from the benchmark models seem correct.  
 
The regime variable was not significant in any of models, giving little credence to the idea 
that regime characteristics has an impact on terrorist events. The existence of a curvilinear 
relationship has also been controlled for. While no significant relationship was found between 
regime type and terrorist events alone, the interaction terms included in model 7 present some 
interesting finds. The interaction term for remittances and non-OECD countries is significant 
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in the transnational models. As seen in Fig.9 it becomes clear that the potential effect of 
remittances on terrorism is strongest in OECD countries. Based on the criteria for OECD 
membership it would seem that democratic regimes with free market economies are more 
vulnerable to the impact of remittances, than non-OECD countries. This demonstrates that the 
economic structure and ideological model of a country might influence the impact of 
remittances inflows on terrorists, rather than regime type alone.   
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5 Conclusion 
This thesis has studied the impact of remittances and economic inequality on terrorist events, 
both transnational and domestic. It began with a short look at the two main theoretical 
approaches: the deprivation school and the rational actor school. These two theories were 
subsequently connected to the ongoing discussion on “greed versus grievance” driven 
terrorism and how they relate to remittances and economic inequality. With remittances 
representing the greed and RA argument and economic inequality representing the grievance 
and DA argument.  
 
This was followed by a conceptualization of terrorism, remittances and economic inequality 
as academic terms, before studying the shifting view on remittances: from a potential form of 
development aid to a possible source of funding for terrorism. Remittances are a substantial 
source of external capital, and play a central part in the economies of low-income countries. 
The lack of solid remittance data has created a lacuna in studies on remittances and their 
impact on both transnational and domestic terrorism, with the exception of Mascarenhas and 
Sandler’s study (2013). The thesis developed further on their findings by studying the impact 
of underlying economic inequality, in addition to remittance inflows.   
 
Based on a review of relevant literature, five hypotheses were formulated. To be able to 
answer these hypotheses the thesis applied a time series cross-sectional analysis. The 
application of count data modeling is common in criminology related studies and was also 
adopted for this thesis. Using negative binomial estimation enabled us to observe how 
remittance inflows and existing inequality within a country affected the number of terrorist 
events.  
 
The results were highly dependent on whether the model was featuring transnational or 
domestic events. Both remittances and economic inequality were significantly associated with 
transnational terrorist mobilization, giving support to H1 and H4. Domestic terrorism is 
significantly associated with economic inequality, but there are no indications of a significant 
relationship between domestic terrorism and remittance inflows, dissuading H2 but giving 
support to H3 and H5. The findings have also been controlled, by running sensitivity analysis 
in the form of alternative models and robustness checks on the benchmark models. Fixed-
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effects models and endogenization were also applied to control for endogeneity bias amongst 
the main independent variables.  
 
This thesis has contributed to our understanding of terrorism in the following ways. First it 
builds a theoretical foundation based on a variety of disciplines, ranging from criminology, 
psychology and history to economics, and of course political science. The theory developed 
for this thesis is original and novel. Second, by using new data, gathered from a variety of 
sources such the World Bank, ITERATE, GTD, SWIID and the Polity IV dataset, I have been 
able to construct large-n dataset on terrorism, remittances and inequality. The use of these 
data and the introduction of new explanatory factors have also been central to develop further 
on the Sandler and Mascarenhas study (2013). The role of remittances in terrorist 
mobilization is understudied, and the thesis has contributed to further our understanding by 
also applying variable controls for causality and endogeneity issues related to the inequality 
and remittances variables. Lastly, the thesis has paid detailed and careful attention to the 
research design, which has resulted in robust findings that support some of Sandler and 
Mascarenhas earlier findings, as well as dissuade some of them.  
 
5.1 Implications 
The findings are interesting and indicate that further study is needed on the end use of 
remittances. The results from domestic model contradict the results of previous studies on 
remittances and terrorism. The lack of significant association between remittances and 
domestic terrorism could possibly be the explained by domestic terrorism being funded 
locally, rather than by international backers. Meanwhile, the transnational models found 
significant explanatory power in the remittance variable. Any definite conclusions based on 
this are difficult to ascertain, but the findings indicate that there is a very real possibility of a 
connection between remittance inflows and transnational terrorist events. The connection 
between terrorism and remittance inflows is tenuous, but there is enough evidence to warrant 
further studies on remittances as funding for transnational terrorism. The lack of micro level 
data on the end use of remittances is problematic and it will be necessary with further studies 
as better micro data on remittances becomes available.  
 
The interaction between inequality and group identity (i.e. horizontal inequalities), has not 
been studied as a part of the thesis, but should in future studies be investigated. Fractionalized 
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societies are not necessarily problematic by themselves, but it is rather the existence of severe 
inequalities in some of these groups that leads to polarization and possible conflict. There 
exist different distributional indicators for ethnic and religious groups: fractionalization, 
polarization and Lorenz domination (Esteban & Ray 2008). This thesis has focused on 
fractionalization. Future studies should seek to expand on this and study the interactions 
between for example Lorenz dominance/income inequality and polarization. The effect of 
inequality in resource access coinciding with group divisions should be further explored, as 
well as how different forms of inequality interact with remittances and terrorist events.  
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Appendix 
A.1 Variables and sources 
The following independent variables were used as a foundation for the statistical models of 
the thesis and the graphs presented within the text:  
 
The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2013): 
 Workers’ remittances, received (% of GDP) 
 (Trade) Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
 (Trade) Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
 Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 
 GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 
 Population, total 
The Standardized World Income Inequality Database: 
 Gini index 
Uppsala Armed Conflict Database: 
 Number of conflicts 
Fractionalization data: 
 Ethnic fractionalization 
 Religious fractionalization 
The Polity IV Project: 
 Polity 2 
A.2 Excluded squared terms from benchmark model 
Variables  Transnational Domestic 
Remittances 0.035** 0.006 
GINI 0.020** 0.0149* 
Trade -0.013** -0.003 
FDI -0.084** -0.025* 
ln(GDP per capita) 1.319 1.439** 
Ln(GDP per capita2) -0.069 -0.080** 
Ethnic fractionalization -2.030 -3.960** 
Ethnic fractionalization
2 
2.048 4.376** 
Religious fractionalization -3.375** -3.550** 
Religious fractionalization
2 
3.231** 4.361** 
Ln(population size) 0.112 0.250*** 
Conflict 0.728*** 1.089*** 
Event 0.027*** 0.006*** 
Regime -0.013 0.045** 
Regime
2 
-0.000 -0.003 
Africa -1.166** -0.530 
America -0.632* -0.410 
Asia -0.590* -0.506* 
Europe -0.462 -0.214 
Constant -8.449* -12.047*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level **Significant at 
the 5% level *Significant at the 10% level 
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A.4 Tolerance 
To test for multicollinearity amongst the X variables we run a multiple regression. As the 
tolerance test is only testing the X-variables it does not matter that the dependent variable is a 
count variable. Tolerance values: 
 
Variables 
Tolerance values excluded 
polynomial terms 
Remittances 0.833 
Trade 0.548 
FDI 0.822 
GDP per capita 0.504 
GDP per capita^2 - 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.581 
Religious fractionalization 0.846 
Conflict 0.864 
Event 0.927 
Regime 0.716 
Total population size 0.622 
Interaction term - 
Gini 0.581 
 
The tolerance value of each independent variable represents the proportion of the variance not 
shared with the other independent variables. If the tolerance values fall beneath .2 or .1, the 
analysis is considered less stable (Hamilton 1992). By including interaction terms  
A.5 Fixed-effects model 
Two-Way Fixed-Effects Model 
GINI  -0.0078 (-1.47)   
Trade -0.0011 (-0.40)   
FDI 0.0181 (1.14)    
Remittancest-1 0.8687*** (40.46)  
Constant 1.0836** (2.69)    
Observations 2,202  
R
2 
0.973  
NOTE: Robust z statistics, adjusted over countries, in 
parentheses. Coefficients for country and year dummies not 
shown. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% 
level. 
A.6-7 Alternative models with year dummies
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Table 6 Alternative transnational models with year dummies 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Remittances 0.030** .027*** 0.025** 0.030** 0.028**  0.031** 
GINI 0.030**  0.029** 0.029** 0.025**  0.024** 
Trade -0.006 -0.004  -0.007 -0.007  -0.006 
FDI -0.028 -0.033** -0.040  -0.029  -0.031 
ln(GDP per capita) 0.152* 0.060 0.143 .155*   0.228* 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.030 0.107 -0.097 -0.028 -0.023  0.011 
Religious 
fractionalization 
-3.7956** -2.491** -3.693** -3.753** -3.268**  -4.107* 
Religious 
fractionalization
2
 
3.612** 2.000 3.382** 3.488**   4.038* 
ln(population size) 0.207** 0.252*** 0.292*** 0.207** 0.207**  0.203** 
Ongoing conflict 0.846*** 0.962*** 0.871*** 0.863*** 0.818***  0.879*** 
Previous event 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029***  0.029*** 
Regime 0.010 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.019  0.010 
Africa -1.437** -0.937** -1.281** -1.409** -1.654***  -1.363** 
America -0.681* -0.190 -0.536 -0.703* -0.728**  -0.692* 
Asia -1.057** -0.890** -1.083** -1.063** -1.270***  -0.977** 
Europe -0.498 -0.431 -0.485 -0.522 -0.400  -0.498 
OECD       -0.929 
OECD x remittances       0.079 
OECD x GINI       0.017 
Constant -7.452*** -6.335*** -9.128*** -7.391*** -5.890***  -7.861*** 
Observations 2001 2426 2003 2041 2022  2001 
Wald test (X2) 1042.42*** 856.48*** 944.14*** 1072.69*** 850.18***  1106.91*** 
Note: Coefficients for year dummy variables are not shown. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1 
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Table 7. Alternative domestic models with year dummies 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Remittances 0.006 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.000  0.007 
GINI 0.017**  .016** 0.017* 0.019**  0.011 
Trade -0.003 -0.001  -0.004* -0.002  -0.003 
FDI -0.027* -0.035*** -0.032***  -0.026*  -0.029** 
ln(GDP per capita) 1.578** 1.676** 1.453* 1.611**   1.478** 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -0.089** -0.097** -0.082 -0.091**   -0.083** 
Ethnic fractionalization -3.977** -3.938** -3.832** -4.084** -3.374*  -2.697 
Ethnic fractionalization
2
 4.436** 4.346** 4.279** 4.529** 3.728  2.946 
Religious fractionalization -3.655** -2.548* -3.328** -3.541** -2.883  -4.2609** 
Religious fractionalization
2
 4.499** 2.924* 4.407** 4.349** 3.635  5.334** 
ln(population size) 0.245*** 0.292*** 0.281*** 0.238*** 0.229***  .2238*** 
Ongoing conflict 1.112*** 1.139*** 1.114*** 1.103*** 1.077***  1.1436*** 
Previous event 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***  0.006*** 
Regime 0.036** 0.045*** 0.036** 0.035** 0.039**  0.042** 
Africa -0.526 0.038 -0.493 -0.548 -0.955**  -0.617 
America -0.400 0.090 -0.345 -0.468* -0.372  -0.471* 
Asia -0.508* -0.196 -0.537** -0.539** -0.797**  -0.525** 
Europe -0.198 0.003 -0.212 -0.245 -0.207  -0.167 
OECD       -1.382** 
OECD x remittances       -0.046 
OECD x GINI       0.039** 
Constant -12.763*** -13.206*** -12.995*** -12.673*** -5.371***  -11.723*** 
Observations 1960 2387 1963 2002 1981  1960 
Wald test (X2) 18932.54*** 20789.03*** 17663.88*** 18888.60*** 17833.09***  19528.47*** 
Note: Coefficients for year dummy variables are not shown. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1 
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A.8- 11 Pearson’s residuals 
Transnational residual plot: remittances 
 
 
 
 
Transnational residual plot: Gini 
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Domestic residual plot: remittances 
 
 
 
 
Domestic residual plot: Gini 
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A.12 List of countries in the estimation sample
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Andorra 
Angola 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominican 
Republic 
East Timor 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong SAR 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kosovo 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macao SAR 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
North Korea 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Palestinian 
Territories 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syria 
Taiwan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab 
Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States of 
America 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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